ARTICLES
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I. INTRODUCTION

The simultaneous firings of seven United States Attorneys on December 7, 2006, provided a fascinating glimpse into the Bush
Administration's policies and methods of operation.1 As more of the
facts surrounding the firings emerged through the revelation of a series
of documents and testimony before congressional committees, media
attention focused on the details of who was responsible for the firings,
the reasons for them, and the role of the affair in the intense partisan conflict gripping Washington after the Democrats won control of both the
House and Senate in November of 2006.
t Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University. B.A., Oberlin College;
Ph.D., Yale University.
1. The seven were Carol Lam, Southern District of California; Kevin Ryan, Northern District
of California; Paul K. Charlton, District of Arizona; Daniel K. Bogden, District of Nevada;
David C. Iglesias, District of New Mexico; John McKay, Western District of Washington; and
Margaret Chiara, Western District of Michigan. Two others, Bud Cummins of the Western District
of Arkansas, and Todd Graves of the Western District of Missouri, were fired earlier in
2006, but their dismissals became public knowledge only after the firings in December.
Other U.S. Attorneys named in emails discussing who should be dismissed have resigned,
raising the possibility that the number of forced resignations is greater than nine. Indeed, Karl Warner, District of West Virginia, told the Associated Press that he was asked to resign in 2005, refused,
and received a letter from White House Counsel Harriet Miers stating that he had been fired. Matt
Apuzzo, Ex U.S. Prosecutor Questions Own Firing, WASH. POST, May 11, 2007, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/05/l 1/AR2007051101179.html?tid=informbox. There has also been speculation that Thomas DiBiagio, District of Maryland, who resigned in 2005, was forced from office.
Scott Lilly, Attorney Scandal Without Precedent: CRS Report Reveals Audacity of Dismissals, Mar.
20, 2007, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/03/crs report.html.
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The media, the political establishment, and the federal criminal justice community's focus on the compelling story of the firings is hardly
surprising. The details emerged over a period of many months through
leaks, internal Department of Justice (DOJ) emails, press releases, interviews, and dramatic congressional testimony. The media's focus on the
firings obscured their deeper significance with regard to the nature of the
relations between the DOJ and its ninety-three United States Attorneys'
Offices (USAOs). This Article addresses this omission by looking at the
consequences of these events for the balance struck between central control by Main Justice in Washington and autonomy for U.S. Attorneys in
the field. The Article argues that the firings represent a departure from
the historic balance of control as part of a broader effort by the DOJ to
centralize operations and recapture
some of the control Main Justice had
2
decades.
three
past
the
lost over
Part II of this Article begins by describing the arguments for central
control by Main Justice and for field autonomy for USAOs as an aspect
of a fundamental clash of values in American politics between the necessity for a strong central government and the value of local autonomy.
Part III examines both the shared and conflicting attitudes toward the
proper balance between central control and field autonomy that existed in
the 1960s and early 1970s, the factors that determined where the balance
2. The descriptions of the relations between USAOs and the DOJ, as well as the descriptions of
the traditional consensus that existed concerning them, are based upon the author's 1978 book on
U.S. Attorneys: JAMES EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES: U.S. ATTORNEYS IN THE
LEGAL AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS (The John Hopkins University Press, 1978) (1978). That book

drew upon some 200 interviews conducted in 1965 and 1970-1971 with U.S. Attorneys, Assistant
U.S. Attorneys, defense attorneys, U.S. District Court judges, probation officers, and federal investigative agents in thirteen districts of varying size and location, as well as with career attorneys and
political appointees within the DOJ.
Throughout this Article, "political appointees" refers to DOJ officials requiring Senate
confirmation (the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, and Assistant Attorneys General) and
their appointed deputies and counselors who lack civil service protection. Career attorneys at Main
Justice often refer to these officials as "the temporary help." Rather than clutter this Article with
repeated citations to Counsel for the United States, readers should assume that unless otherwise
noted, assertions about relations between the DOJ and U.S. Attorneys, and the attitudes that accompanied them are based on the research reported therein. Research on U.S. Attorneys (especially
empirical social science research) published since Counselfor the United States is limited and does
not provide much information describing developments since the early 1970s. However, after the
2006 firings, news reports, congressional hearings, and internal DOJ c-mails and documents made
public provide useful insights into the relationship of the U.S. Attorneys with the DOJ; these sources
will be relied upon heavily in this Article.
Finally, in 2002-2003, the author participated in a National Science Foundation-funded study
titled, Uncharted Territory: A Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis of Inter-District Variation in the
Federal Criminal Justice System) (unpublished study on file with the author) [hereinafter Uncharted
Territory Study], that conducted over 300 interviews in seven districts. Though this research did not
primarily focus on USAOs or their interactions with Main Justice, the research provides some useful
information that updates the descriptions found in Counselfor the United States.
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was struck in a district, and the patterns that resulted.
Part III
concludes with a summary of the consensus that then existed on when
U.S. Attorneys could be fired. Part IV provides an update of the patterns
that characterized relations between U.S. Attorneys and Main Justice
four decades ago by examining the factors that have since enhanced both
field autonomy and headquarters control. Part V describes the "strategy
of centralization" pursued by the George W. Bush Administration, made
evident by the firings of U.S. Attorneys, as well as its effects on USAOs.
The Article concludes in Part VI with some thoughts on the factors that
will determine where, in the aftermath of the firings in 2006, the balance
between field autonomy and central control will be struck.

IL. COMPETING PERSPECTIVES ON THE PROPER BALANCE BETWEEN
U.S. ATTORNEY AUTONOMY AND MAIN JUSTICE CONTROL

The American political system embraces a number of valued principles which cannot be fully realized without creating conflict with other
equally revered principles. Much of our political life involves a neverending struggle over how to adjust the existing balance between such
conflicting values. The conflict between the right to a fair trial and freedom of the press provides an important example. The firings of U.S.
Attorneys in 2006 illustrate one of the most important, enduring, and
difficult value clashes-the desire for an effective central government in
Washington, D.C. versus the wish to preserve autonomy at the state and
local level.
The problem of where to locate policy-making authority is particularly acute in the criminal justice system.3 Federal criminal law poses an
especially prickly and stubborn problem, as good arguments can be made
both for central direction of policy from Main Justice and for autonomy
for the nation's ninety-three USAOs. 4 The justifications for central control will be examined first, followed by the competing rationales for U.S.
Attorney autonomy.5
3. The same can be said for civil law.
Counsel for the United States discusses
field/headquarters conflicts in a number of aspects of federal civil law, including civil tax, land condemnation, and tort litigation. EISENSTEIN, supra note 2. Conflict in these areas continues-a point
worth remembering given the focus of this Article on criminal justice.
4. There is a USAO for each of the ninety-four federal district courts, with the exceptions of
the Districts of Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands, which are collectively served by a single
USAO. Each state has at least one USAO, and in no case does the jurisdiction of a USAO extend
beyond a state's boundaries. The remaining USAOs are in the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico,
and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
5. The competing arguments for central control and local autonomy summarized in this and the
following Part of this Article were expressed in numerous comments made by both DOJ attorneys
and U.S. Attorneys and their assistants in interviews conducted for COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED
STATES,
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A. The Casefor CentralControl of Federal
CriminalJustice Prosecution
The principal justification for central control of the USAOs from
Washington is that the federal government has an obligation to pursue
the same broad law enforcement goals everywhere in the nation. If different U.S. Attorneys emphasized the prosecution of different crimes, it
would compromise the principle of equal justice and produce a hodgepodge of enforcement patterns. Similarly, if the ninety-three USAOs
adopted starkly different prosecution policies toward, for example, bank
robberies, drug possession, or gun crimes, people who committed the
same federal crime in different districts would have very different outcomes, further undermining the principle of equal justice. If violators of
federal criminal law are to be equally subject to prosecution and receive
comparable sentences regardless of where they live, nationwide guidelines for initiating prosecution and for disposing of cases need to be established and uniformly implemented.
Furthermore, a democratically elected administration must decide
how much to emphasize a variety of law enforcement goals and policies,
such as fighting organized crime syndicates, pursuing the death penalty,
reducing gun violence, enforcing immigration laws, prosecuting corporate crime, combating terrorism, or attacking healthcare fraud. Because
an administration cannot pursue all goals equally, it must develop its own
law enforcement policies based on the values of the President and Attorney General. If U.S. Attorneys do not adhere to these policies, the Administration's goals will not be realized.
Another reason for lodging decisions in the DOJ is that the Administration and the DOJ bear the responsibility of setting policies when new
criminal statutes come into force. New criminal laws need to be interpreted and prosecuted uniformly if they are to be applied uniformly.
Prosecution of weak cases in one district runs the risk of producing bad
precedents that will affect litigation everywhere.
Therefore, Main
Justice needs to oversee the implementation of new laws closely. Similar
arguments justify central control over what cases will be appealed, especially when there is a conflict between circuits. From Main Justice's perspective, although a USAO may feel strongly that a case should be appealed, the DOJ must see the bigger picture and assess how a precedent
set by that case might jeopardize the outcome of similar cases everywhere.

especially when the interviewees discussed relations between Main Justice and USAOs.
EISENSTEIN, supra note 2, at chs. 3-4, for more examples.

See
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Other mechanisms of central control follow from the reasons just
described. Main Justice needs to establish procedures and policies, such
as those found in the U.S. Attorneys' Manual,6 and to enforce adherence
to them.' Enforcement requires monitoring USAO activities and performance through periodic inspections and mandated reporting systems.
Moreover, Main Justice needs an extensive training program to induce its
prosecutors to follow policies uniformly.
These arguments underlie the broad agreement that every new administration can select U.S. Attorneys who are committed to its law enforcement goals and who will faithfully implement them. Hardly anyone
believes it is illegitimate for a new president to appoint his own U.S. Attorneys, to ask for the resignation of the previous administration's appointees, and to fire those who refuse to resign. Likewise, it stands to
reason that an appointee who actively ignores or undermines Main
Justice's policies can be asked to resign or, if necessary, be fired. Renegade U.S. Attorneys who pursue radically different policies from other
U.S. Attorneys, who engage in questionable personal behavior, or who
violate norms of professional integrity can be legitimately removed by
the President to defend the integrity and image of the federal justice system.
B. The Casefor Local Autonomy for USA Os
The mission statement of the DOJ explicitly recognizes the legitimacy and value of a U.S. Attorney's discretion.
Each United States Attorney is the chief federal law enforcement
officer of the United States within his or her particular jurisdiction
....
Each United States Attorney exercises wide discretion in the
use of his/her resources to further the priorities of the local jurisdictions and needs of their communities.8
As chief law enforcement officer for a federal district, typically encompassing numerous local jurisdictions and sometimes an entire state, a
U.S. Attorney has an obligation to deal with crime problems that state
and local officials either cannot or will not address. Sometimes, local
6. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS'
MANUAL (2007) [hereinafter MANUAL], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading_room/usam/.
7. Id. The MANUAL is a loose-leaf text designed as a quick and ready reference for United
States Attorneys, Assistant United States Attorneys, and DOJ attorneys responsible for the prosecution of violations of federal law. It contains general policies and some procedures relevant to the
work of the USAOs and to their relations with the legal divisions, investigative agencies, and other
components within the DOJ. Id.
8. United States Attorneys' Mission Statement, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/ (last visited Nov.
11,2007).
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prosecutors and judges lack the competence or motivation to deal with
problems such as gun or gang violence. Sometimes, the magnitude of
the problem or complexity of a prosecution overwhelms local resources.
For example, drug traffickers, whose activities cross state and even international barriers, cannot be successfully dealt with by most local police
and prosecutors. Large health care or corporate fraud conspiracies pose
nearly insurmountable obstacles to local criminal justice systems. There
is little incentive for local prosecutors to pursue cases involving police
misconduct or corruption by local elected politicians. By the same token, crimes that receive vigorous prosecution due to local attitudes in
some jurisdictions-for example, obscenity-are not regarded as serious
enough to warrant much attention in others.
U.S. Attorneys have a unique competence because they typically
possess an intimate understanding of their local communities, including
the nature of social and economic problems. They also know many influential people, such as criminal justice system personnel, business and
labor leaders, political officials, and other well-connected individuals.
Furthermore, U.S. Attorneys have access to the impressive resources of
the federal government, including federal law enforcement agencies,
when addressing local crime problems. As such, only the local U.S. Attorney has a complete picture of all the crime problems each local district
faces. U.S. Attorneys are generalists, responsible for the enforcement of
the full range of federal criminal statutes.
At Main Justice, all but the very top leadership of the DOJ specializes in a narrow range of cases handled individually by its divisions and
sections. Justice Department lawyers cannot assess the relative importance of either crime problems outside of their responsibility or other
pending cases in the district. A case that Main Justice regards as vitally
important and especially good may well appear less critical to a U.S. Attorney who knows the full scope of current litigation in the district. Because only a finite number of potential federal prosecutions and
investigations can be undertaken, someone has to decide how to balance
national priorities against pressing local needs. A U.S. Attorney has the
best vantage point from which to make such judgments.
For example, to the question, "Who should decide how many gun
or immigration cases should be initiated in a district?," proponents of
central control answer, "Main Justice." Advocates of U.S. Attorney
autonomy argue that such decisions should be delegated to the local U.S.
Attorney who understands both the importance of national priorities and
knows the local situation on the ground. 9
9. Former Deputy Attorney General James Comey provided a good example of how knowledge
of local conditions needs to be factored into judgments about what cases ought to be prosecuted. A
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Another justification for local autonomy is that in a nation as politically, socially, economically, and culturally diverse as the United States,
effective implementation of national policy requires knowledge of local
problems, jury tendencies, attitudes of federal judges, and other factors
that determine the success of prosecutions. A cookie-cutter, one-sizefits-all policy of enforcement is likely to create serious problems in many
localities. U.S. Attorneys and their career Assistant U.S. Attorneys
(AUSAs) are uniquely qualified to determine how national priorities can
be translated into reality in each district.
Advocates of local autonomy also argue that striving for uniform
practices in the United States is both unwise and impossible. It is unwise
because it fails to respect the diversity of America and to accommodate
its different cultures and peoples. It is impossible because the diversity
found in local conditions will cause invariant policies to fail. For example, given differences in the nature and extent of the drug problem
around the country, requiring prosecution of all drug seizures at a nationwide threshold would produce undesirable results.
Setting the threshold at a level that makes sense in Miami and other
major cities would eliminate prosecution of most drug seizures in Vermont, Iowa, and Idaho. But a threshold appropriate in small districts
would result in large USAOs prosecuting more cases than their current
staff could handle. A "big" drug case in Omaha is small potatoes in Los
Angeles. Similarly, mandating how U.S. Attorneys should deal with local law enforcement officials fails to recognize differences from
district to district. One large USAO visited in 2002 counted 17 local police departments in its jurisdiction, whereas a middle-sized USAO had
750 police chiefs operating within its district.' °

Hearingon the U.S. Attorney Firings Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law
of the H. Judiciary Comm., I 10th Cong. (2007) (statements of James Comey, former Deputy Att'y
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpavailable at
United
States),
of
the
Gen.
dyn/content/article/2007/05107/AR2007050701299.html. He testified that the number of gun prosecutions "tells you nothing in a vacuum." Id.
But as I've explained to people a bunch of times, when I was running the U.S. Attorneys' Office in Richmond, Virginia, there was a real need for a federal impact on gun
possession crimes. Because people weren't getting the kind of time they needed to reduce violent crime in the state system. When I moved to being U.S. Attorney in Manhattan, [Manhattan District Attorney] Bob Morgenthau and his office were all over gun
possession crimes, and doing it very aggressively. So my approach changed.
Id. He later reiterated that by "just comparing my experience in Manhattan to my experience in
Richmond, my gun numbers per capita dropped off dramatically when I became U.S. Attorney in
Manhattan." ld For a good general discussion of how USAOs' prosecutorial policies are formed,
see Todd Lochner, Strategic Behavior and Prosecutorial Agenda Setting in United States
Attorneys' Offices: The Role of U.S. Attorneys and Their Assistants, 23 JUST. Sys. J. 271 (2002).
10. UnchartedTerritoryStudy, supra note 2.
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Finally, a degree of autonomy and independence for USAOs can
serve as a check on Main Justice if its leadership violates the principles
of non-political equal justice. Just as there may be an occasional renegade U.S. Attorney who needs to be removed, there may also be renegade DOJ officials or even the entire leadership at Main Justice which
may attempt to corrupt federal criminal justice for partisan or venal reasons. A system where U.S. Attorneys enjoy the discretion and a willingness to say "no" to the DOJ can provide an important check on improper
or even illegal directives from Washington.

III. THE HISTORICAL BALANCE STRUCK BETWEEN CENTRAL
CONTROL AND LOCAL AUTONOMY IN THE 1960S AND 1970s
Given the competing perspectives on what the balance between
central control and field autonomy ought to be, what patterns actually
emerged in practice four decades ago? To answer this question, this Article will first look at two factors: (1) What beliefs field and headquarters
personnel shared about their relations with each other; and (2) the content of the significant disagreements that existed. Next, the factors that
determined the actual degree of autonomy each U.S. Attorney exercised
will be identified. Subsequently, the actual patterns of Main Justice and
U.S. Attorney relations that emerged from the confluence of these factors
will be described. Finally, the consensus on the tenure of U.S. Attorneys, especially concerning when they could be fired, will be summarized.
A. Sharedand Competing Perspectives
on Headquartersand FieldRelations
The arguments for central control and local autonomy were familiar
to Main Justice and USAO attorneys interviewed in 1965 and the early
1970s. 11 Indeed, at that time there was a widely shared consensus among
both field and headquarters personnel regarding several central principles.' 2 U.S. Attorneys serving four decades ago recognized the right of
Main Justice to determine the general outlines of federal law enforcement policy and to oversee its implementation. Second, at that time both
l1. See generally EISENSTEIN, supranote 2, at ch. 4.
12. In the aftermath of the firings, the statements of many current and former attorneys in the
DOJ and USAOs show that the main elements of this consensus continue to the current day, as seen
in the text and footnotes throughout this Article. Novelist Scott Turow, a former federal prosecutor,
expressed two of the central tenets of this consensus, noting that a U.S. Attorney is "a figure of
unique autonomy, whose right to pursue individual cases as she or he sees fit, with the framework of
Washington's policy directives, has been largely unquestioned for generations and is rooted in the
Office's local responsibilities." Scott Turow, It's Up to Gonzales Now, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 2007,
at B .

2008]

U.S. Attorneys and Main Justice's CentralizationEfforts

227

career and political appointees at Main Justice accepted that U.S. Attorneys needed to exercise discretion in implementing DOJ policies. Of
course, individual U.S. Attorneys tended to adhere more closely to those
principles that favored their own position. But even the most independent-minded U.S. Attorneys and their assistants acknowledged, albeit
begrudgingly, the necessity for central direction of policy. Likewise,
attorneys in Washington understood that U.S. Attorneys needed some
discretion in carrying out their duties.
The third and most significant element of the reigning consensus
held that everyone should carry out their duties in a non-partisan, fair,
and professional manner. The 2006 firings of U.S. Attorneys produced a
number of expressions of this sentiment. In an Op-Ed piece in the Los
Angeles Times, one of the fired U.S. Attorneys observed that "[a]ll federal prosecutors take a public oath when they assume office.... The oath
is to the U.S. Constitution, not to the president or his cabinet."13 The
National Association of Former United States Attorneys (NAFUSA), in a
letter to Attorney General Gonzales on February 1, 2007, observed,
"[m]ost importantly, United States Attorneys have maintained a strong
tradition of insuring that the laws of the Untied States are faithfully executed, without
favor to anyone and without regard to any political con14
sideration."'

13. David C. Iglesias, 'Cowboy Up,' Alberto: A Fired U.S. Attorney Calls on the Attorney
General to Serve the People, Not Politics, Los ANGELES TIMES, May 23, 2007, at 21. He also asserted that what was at stake was "the rule of law, the independence of the prosecutor and the apolitical calculus of who should be prosecuted." Id.
14. Letter to Attorney General Gonzales, NAFUSA Newsletter, (NAFUSA, Las Vegas, NV)
Mar. 2007, at 3 [hereinafter NAFUSA Newsletter]. The NAFUSA letter also stated that, "[w]e are
concerned that the role of the United States Attorneys may have been undermined by what may have
been political considerations, which run counter to the proper administration of justice and the tradition of the DOJ." Id.
Among the many other statements demonstrating the depth and breadth of this consensus, two
are especially noteworthy. The former U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles, Debra Yang, commented,
"[t]he greatest travesty here is that you don't want to take away the independence of the U.S. Attorney's Office. The public relies on the impartiality of their prosecutions. To have it operate on anything less does a huge disservice to us as a nation." Jason McLure & T.R. Goldman, Attorney Scandal

Threatens

Gonzales'

Job,

LEGAL

TIMES,

Mar.

19,

2007,

available

at

http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=l 174035822692. Senator Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.), a former
U.S. Attorney, expressed similar sentiments on the Senate floor:
So most of the people who are appointed have some sort of political heritage or background, but when you take that oath, when a person becomes a U.S. Attorney and they
are asked to evaluate the merits of an existing case before them as to whether a person
should be charged, as to what kind of plea bargain should be entered into in the course
of a prosecution, they should follow the law, they should follow their personal integrity
and do the right thing regardless of any politics, regardless of whether that defendant or
the person involved in a civil lawsuit is a Republican, a Democrat, rich or poor, whatever. They have taken an oath to enforce the laws fairly against everyone.
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It is important to avoid the temptation to view this period as a
"golden age." It was not a perfect system. Not all U.S. Attorneys
behaved in a non-partisan, apolitical way. Neither did every Attorney
General, as the actions of John Mitchell during Watergate and Edwin
Meese during the Iran-Contra affair demonstrate. 15 Furthermore, within
the general confines of this consensus, significant differences emerged
between field and headquarters personnel about where the balance between central control and local autonomy should be struck. Even here,
the mix of opinions was complex. Differences existed both among U.S.
Attorneys and DOJ personnel. The Main Justice attorneys most cognizant of the value of some autonomy for U.S. Attorneys did not go so far
as most U.S. Attorneys, and most U.S. Attorneys told tales of "know itall" Main Justice types directing them to do silly things. 16 These differences between-field and headquarters personnel within the general consensus helped produce an undercurrent of tension, conflict, and mutual
resentment that colored interactions between most (but not all) USAOs
and the DOJ.
B. The Determinants of U.S. Attorney and DOJRelations
In practice, how much autonomy did USAOs exert during the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon Administrations? 17 Part of the answer depends on when during the tenure of an administration the question is
asked. When the Kennedy and Nixon Administrations came to power,
the new set of inexperienced U.S. Attorneys that were appointed shared a
sense of excitement and commitment to the President and Attorney General and their policy goals. Most, therefore, were predisposed to follow
Main Justice's policies and instructions. At that time, in nearly all districts there were virtually no career assistants with experience in dealing
with Washington. U.S. Attorneys had little understanding of how much
discretion they might be able to exercise or how to do it. However, as
Debate on the Preserving United States Attorneys'Independence Act of 2007, 110th Cong. (Mar. 19,
2007) available at http://sessions.senate.gov/pressapp/record.cfm?id=271208 [hereinafter Preserving U.S. Attorneys' Independence] (floor statement of Senator Sessions). At another point,

referring to this obligation, Sessions observed, "[t]hat is a tradition which most of the public may not
know but is deeply understood throughout the DOJ. Id.
15. A former Nixon Administration U.S. Attorney provided another example. He wrote in his
book that in 1971 at the Annual Conference of U.S. Attorneys, then-Attorney General Richard
Kliendienst said that it was "of the utmost importance to keep this Administration in power and you
men must do everything you can to insure that result." WHITNEY NORTH SEYMOUR, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY 159 (1975).
16. EISENSTEIN, supra note 2.

In a number of districts, attorneys described cases where the

DOJ refused to authorize recommended settlements in civil cases that went to trial and resulted in
higher awards against the government. See id, supra note 2, at 68.

17. For a more detailed discussion of this question, see EISENSTEIN, supra note 2, at ch. 6.
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they and the AUSAs they recruited gained experience, they better understood the possibilities for exercising discretion and increasingly wished
to do so. U.S. Attorneys who replaced appointees who left office were
less likely to partake of the camaraderie and excitement that characterized the first years of the Administration. A similar maturing and erosion
of enthusiasm characterized the attitudes of political appointees at Main
Justice. Consequently, U.S. Attorneys exerted more autonomy further
into a president's term of office.
A number of district-level factors shaped the degree of control the
DOJ exerted over the USAOs independent of the passage of time. The
size of the office by far constituted the most important factor promoting
autonomy. Larger offices had the flexibility and expertise needed to
handle complex cases and were able to shift AUSAs' assignments, reducing the need to rely on Main Justice attorneys dispatched to the district to
handle cases. Smaller offices lacked the resources and expertise to cope
cases, and depended on DOJ attorneys
with complex or time consuming
18
to handle part of the case load.
The ability of the U.S. Attorney and his assistants and their reputation in the DOJ also affected autonomy. Some U.S. Attorneys enjoyed a
reputation for being smart and effective. Their arguments in disputes
with Main Justice carried more weight, and their assertions that they
could handle difficult cases were more credible. Others were known to
be weak and unreliable, and they attracted closer scrutiny and control.
Additionally, the culture and traditions of the USAOs and the federal district court community, especially the judges, with respect to control from Washington also played a role. A few districts enjoyed a rich
tradition of independence, a tradition sustained by judges and the network of former U.S. Attorneys and AUSAs practicing in the district.
Most offices, however, lacked such traditions.
The stance of Main Justice's political leadership toward U.S. Attorney autonomy and its emphasis on controlling its field offices was also a
key factor. Attorneys General, of course, typically adhere to the rationale for central control. Though the emphasis placed on establishing Main
Justice's authority varied during the 1960s and early 1970, the differences were not great, and the efforts to exert central control were far less
ambitious than during the Administration of George W. Bush.
Finally, the personality and inclinations of U.S. Attorneys toward
direction and control from the DOJ varied substantially. Some regarded
themselves as "field officers" of the DOJ whose duty was to faithfully
carry out the DOJ's wishes. One such individual stated that "[t]he U.S.
18. For a more detailed discussion of the importance of district size, see EISENSTEIN, supra
note 2, at 190-92.
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Attorney is part of the executive branch. .
. Our home office is
Washington .... I defer to them when they feel something should be

handled by the Department. I do everything to accommodate them." 19
At the opposite extreme, a few felt that they should be largely
autonomous, and deliberately limited the conditions under which they
would accept DOJ authority. They typically resisted, sometimes fiercely,
attempts by the DOJ to dispatch attorneys from Washington to take over
cases. One described flying to Washington to meet with the Attorney
General after a fierce argument with an Assistant Attorney General over
who would handle an important case. This attitude extended to some
AUSAs. "If the Attorney General orders it, then all right," said one outspoken AUSA. "But I'm not going to do it just because some schmuck
in the Tax Division thinks I ought to do it that way., 20 However, most
U.S. Attorneys took a middle position, acknowledging the authority of
the DOJ and a willingness to defer to Assistant Attorney Generals' decisions, while chafing at and occasionally fighting attempts by career attorneys at Main Justice to dictate how cases were handled.
C. The Patterns of Main Justice and U.S. Attorney Relations
The many factors identified as shaping the balance between central
control and field autonomy suggest a complex and varied picture. Most
interactions in most districts, most of the time, were characterized by
cooperation, mutual influence, and negotiation of differences, albeit with
an undercurrent of tension. 2 1 A minority involved conflict, confrontation, resistance, and sometimes coercion by the DOJ, and the outcome of
these interactions colored the more frequent cooperative encounters. The
19. EISENSTEIN, supra note 2, at 65.

20. Id at 66. Similar views persist to this day. In 2002, a former U.S. Attorney in a large office interviewed for the Unchartered Territory Study observed: "I'm not in favor of a completely
centralized, dictated-to office, and I think that everybody whose a real U.S. Attorney will tell you the

same thing. There are some U.S. Attorneys that are not real U.S. Attorneys. They're, you know,
they're company men." See EISENSTEIN, supra note 2.
21. In comments made on the Senate floor during consideration of the Preserving the Independence of U.S. Attorney's Act of 2007, Republican Jeff Sessions of Alabama described his relationship with the DOJ when he was a U.S. Attorney:
My impression, my entire experience was that when faced with difficult choices, if I

called the people in Washington and sought their advice or help or insight into how to
handle a difficult matter, they were very respectful of my decision making process.
They would provide support and advice, and they usually deferred to the decision of the
prosecutor.
PreservingU.S. Attorneys'Independence, supranote 14. He also revealed an element of tension:
[U.S. Attorneys] are not entitled to indict anyone they choose without any review within

the Department of Justice, any oversight at all. A lot of us thought sometimes there was
too much of that, but it was mainly a bureaucratic headache you had to go through with
snme cases.
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degree of conflict was limited by the fact that the priorities of most
USAOs and the DOJ coincided. U.S. Attorneys typically wanted to do
what the DOJ wanted them to do with respect to broad policy. 22 When

disputes arose, they usually involved how to proceed in specific cases
within the agreed upon set of priorities or who should handle them.
Several features of the strategic environment during this period
gave the DOJ an advantage in its efforts to control USAOs. By far the
most important factor was that most offices were fairly small. In 1968,
almost half of USAOs had four or fewer AUSAs; by 1975, more than
half still had ten or fewer. 23 AUSAs were very poorly paid and stayed
only as long as it took to get the federal trial experience that could propel
them to a good job in the private sector. The lack of civil service protection meant that even AUSAs who wished to stay usually had to resign
when party control of the presidency changed. As a result, most AUSAs
lacked experience. The lack of manpower further hindered USAOs from
handling difficult and time consuming cases. Indeed, the smallest offices
sometimes had to request the dispatch of career attorneys from Main Justice to help them handle their caseloads. Career attorneys in Washington
were generally very experienced and capable, with their abilities greatly
exceeding those of most AUSAs in most districts. Complex, timeconsuming, and specialized cases requiring expertise could not be handled by the generally inexperienced AUSAs who staffed USAOs.
The confluence of the multiple factors shaping headquarters and
field interactions produced four distinct patterns: "normal," "controlled
or ideal," "conflict," and "semi-autonomous." The most common district
was the "normal" district.24 These districts exhibited six characteristics
in their dealings with Main Justice. First, the level of overt conflict and
disagreement between the USAO and Main Justice was low. Second,
when disputes arose, they were usually resolved through polite compromises. Third, the U.S. Attorneys enjoyed considerable discretion in the
day to day exercise of their duties and the handling of routine cases.
Fourth, when conflicts were not resolved through give and take negotiation, the USAO usually prevailed when the matter did not involve a
22. Field research conducted in 2002 confirmed that U.S. Attorneys continue to share the Administration's law enforcement goals. UnchartedTerritory Study, supranote 2. As one official in a

USAOs generally pursued terrorism, gun
USAO put it, "[t]heir priorities are our priorities."
violence, drugs, and immigration cases vigorously. Not all U.S. Attorneys shared all priorities, as
disagreements over voter fraud prosecutions demonstrate.
23. EISENSTEIN, supra note 2, at 5 (citing 1968 U.S. ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP 93-94).
24. Id. Because only thirteen districts were studied in detail, the frequency of these four pattems cannot be determined precisely. See id., supra note 2, at app. A (describing methodology).
The "normal" pattern probably predominated, though the presence of many small offices undoubtedly resulted in a number of "controlled" districts. Offices "in conflict" were likely rare. Of course,

there was only one "semi-autonomous" district, the Southern District of New York.
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major policy area or important case with high precedent value. Fifth,
Main Justice would prevail on matters not involving major policy when
it really wanted to, but the costs in time and resources of doing so limited
the number of times it could insist on getting its way. For example, the
DOJ could take a case away from the USAO and dispatch a career attorney from Washington to handle it; however, too many disputed cases
existed to do so routinely. Finally, the DOJ nearly always prevailed on
disputes involving major cases or policy areas. For instance, the DOJ
exercised tight control over the prosecution of cases under new statutes
(e.g., airplane bomb threats).
Other offices, usually but not always with four or fewer AUSAs,
were effectively "controlled" by Main Justice, and operated as "ideal
field offices." Disputes were rare, and the office consciously sought to
adhere to DOJ policy. The U.S. Attorneys in these offices regarded the
existence and application of uniform national policies as important. The
offices avoided disputes with headquarters, did not appeal instructions
they disagreed with to a higher level in the DOJ, and seldom pursued
their own policy goals or local initiatives. Personnel in these offices regarded themselves as part of the DOJ, were proud of the many 25friends
they had at headquarters, and revered the U.S. Attorneys' Manual.
A few offices studied could be characterized as "in conflict" with
Main Justice.26 At these offices, the U.S. Attorneys actively sought
autonomy, and the DOJ resisted it. Conflict, often quite heated, was frequent. In one such district, the DOJ wanted to fire the U.S. Attorney but
could not do so because of the political power of his local political supporters, including a prominent mayor with close ties to the President. In
routine cases, disputes often were resolved much as in "normal" districts.
Overall, the USAO enjoyed more autonomy than in the normal district,
but it was limited and came at a high cost in time, effort, and unpleasant
encounters.
At the time the research for Counselfor the United States was conducted, the Southern District of New York, which was the largest USAO
with nearly 70 AUSAs, achieved "semi-autonomous" status. It handled
cases (for example, civil tax matters) that DOJ attorneys took in every
other district, and it undertook a number of initiatives in bringing cases
in new areas on its own. However, even there, major policies regarding
the handling of cases followed national policy. Thus, even with the
25. Several U.S. Attorneys referred to the MANUAL as "the Bible," and one said he followed it
"religiously." EIsENSTEIN, supra note 2, at 66.

26. Id. Attitudes toward the MANUAL in these districts, and some "normal" districts, contrasted
sharply with those found in "field offices." One former U.S. Attorney emphatically stated, "[i]n all
my time there, I never did read the damn MANUAL." Id. at 67.
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"semi-autonomous" status, the office was not completely autonomous
and could not always freely pursue whatever policies it wished. 7
D. The Consensus on the Tenure of US.
Attorneys in the 1960s andEarly 1970s
The controversy over the dismissal of seven U.S. Attorneys on December 7, 2006, prompted considerable public discussion of both of a
president's authority to fire and whether these firings represented "business as usual" or something extraordinary. The nature of a fairly strong
consensus regarding U.S. Attorneys' tenure in the time of the Kennedy,
Johnson, and Nixon Administrations provides a useful perspective on
this discussion.28
U.S. Attorneys traditionally did not expect to continue in office after a change in party control of the presidency.29 When the presidency
changed hands, U.S. Attorneys regarded resigning as "the thing to do."
Occasionally, a U.S. Attorney refused to submit a resignation and was
removed, usually without controversy. 30 Eisenhower replaced Truman's
U.S. Attorneys, Kennedy replaced those of Eisenhower, Clinton replaced
those of George H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush replaced Clinton's.
Instances of an incumbent's refusal to resign were the rare exception.
Firings of his own U.S. Attorneys by a president were also extremely rare four decades ago, 3' and continued to be so afterwards. The
Congressional Research Service (CRS) conducted a study of U.S. Attorneys who left office during a president's term and before their four year
term expired between 1982 and December of 2006.32 Fifty-four fell into
27. The tradition is intact to this day.

U.S. Attorney Mary Jo White, commenting on U.S.

Attorney autonomy, said, "[t]he Southern District is the sovereign district of New York. You know
how I come out on that."

Adam Liptak, For Federal Prosecutors, Politics Is Ever-Present, N.Y.

TIMES, Mar. 18, 2007, § 4. The Office is still routinely referred to this way within the DOJ and by
U.S. Attorneys, though this overstates the Office's degree of autonomy from Main Justice.
28. EISENSTEIN supra note 2, at ch. 3.

29. Little is known about what happens when a new president of the same party assumes office.
However, Senator Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.) recounted that President H.W. Bush asked all Reagan's
hold-over U.S. Attorneys to resign, and many did so. Sessions asked to remain and was allowed to
do so. Preserving U.S. Attorneys'Independence,supranote 14.

30. For example, the U.S. Attorney in the Eastern District of Philadelphia, David Marston,
refused to resign after Jimmy Carter defeated Gerald Ford in the 1976 election, as did Philip VanDam in the Eastern District of Michigan. Federal District Judge Avem Cohn described both incidents in an Op-Ed piece. J. Avern Cohn, Setting the Record Straight, DETROIT LEGAL NEWS, May

7, 2007. Robert M. Morgenthau, appointed by Kennedy in the Southern District of New. York, resisted the Nixon Administration's efforts to remove him, but resigned when according to him he
received an "ultimatum" from the President. David Johnston, Attorney General Seeks Resignations
from Prosecutors,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1993, at Al.
31. EISENSTEIN, supra note 2, at 97-98.
32. KEVIN M. SCOTT, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS WHO HAVE
SERVED LESS THAN FULL FOUR-YEAR TERMS 1981-2006 (2007).
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this category, all but eight of whom left for reasons that appear to be unrelated to their conduct in office. 33 Only two of them could be confirmed
as fired by the President. 34 The CRS found six others for whom no official information was available on why they left, though it found that
three left their positions after questionable conduct became public.35
However, the CRS study does not provide any information about the
continued tenure of U.S. Attorneys who served more than four years,
which was the case for each of the nine U.S. Attorneys fired in 2006.36
The reigning consensus in the late 1960s and early 1970s (and
probably up to President Bush's second term) was that U.S. Attorneys
could stay beyond the fourth anniversary of their appointment until the
president left office unless they had engaged in improper professional or
personal behavior. There was virtually complete agreement that it was
improper to fire a U.S. Attorney for political reasons.3 7 Thus, although
the nine fired U.S. Attorneys had served more than four years, their firings were both unprecedented and counter to a long-standing and
widespread consensus that they could expect to continue to serve until
either they left voluntarily or resigned at the end of an administration.
IV. CHANGES INTHE BALANCE BETWEEN MAIN JUSTICE CONTROL
AND LOCAL USAO AUTONOMY SINCE THE EARLY 1970s

How have the dynamics of the relationship between USAOs and
Main Justice changed since the field research for Counselfor the United
States was completed in the early 1970s? Unfortunately, no comparable
research has been conducted that updates it. Indeed, social scientists,
especially political scientists, have with few exceptions ignored U.S.
33. Among these forty-six, seventeen became federal district or appellate judges, one became a
U.S. magistrate judge, four sought elective office, two went to a position in state government, six
took other positions in the executive branch, one died in office, and fifteen went into private practice. Id. at 5-6.
34. Id. at 6.
35. Id.
36. Id.

37. Some expressions of this consensus have appeared. In the letter sent to Attorney General
Gonzales in spring of 2006, the NAFUSA noted that "the usual practice has been for United States
Attorneys to be permitted to serve for the duration of the administration which appointed them."
NAFUSA Newsletter, supra note 14. In testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee in early

2007, Law Professor and former AUSA Laurie Levenson told the Senators:
The Attorney General's actions [in asking for U.S. Attorneys' dismissals] at this time are
unlike anything that has occurred before .... [W]e have never seen the type of turnover
now in progress, where the Attorney General, not the President, is asking mid-term that
demonstrably capable U.S. Attorneys submit their resignations so that Washington insiders may be appointed in their place.
Is the DOJPoliticizing the Hiringand Firing of US. Attorneys?, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. (2007) (testimony of Laurie L. Levenson, Professor of Law, Loyola Law School), availableat

http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=2516&wit-id=6061.
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Attorneys. 38 However, the same factors that determined the balance between central control and field autonomy continue to operate. It is possible to examine trends in some of these factors, especially the size of
USAOs and the quality of their AUSAs. Little, if any, systematic research exists on the current status of other factors, for example, how vigorously the leadership of the DOJ seeks to control its field offices. 39 Fortunately, as the following discussion demonstrates, the firings of seven
U.S. Attorneys in December 2006 triggered the publication of a good
deal of anecdotal information about such factors. Enough information is
available to identify both the changes that enhanced USAO autonomy
and those that strengthened Main Justice's ability to control its field offices.
A. FactorsPromoting U.S. Attorney
Autonomy from Main Justice
Five interrelated developments since the early 1970s promoted the
ability of U.S. Attorneys to act independently of central control from the
DOJ, shifting the overall balance described above toward more autonomy. First, the number of AUSAs grew dramatically. Second, the position of AUSA was converted from a patronage position with no job protection to a quasi-civil service status that enabled the establishment of a
career service in the field. Third, the emergence of a large group of career AUSAs led to the development of information networks among
them that facilitated independence. Fourth, the establishment of the Attorney General's Advisory Committee of U.S. Attorneys provided a
mechanism for bringing concerns from the field to the DOJ's top leadership. Finally, the vast increase in the scope of federal criminal jurisdiction, the "federalization of criminal justice," promoted greater field
autonomy in the DOJ.

38. Most research on U.S. Attorneys in the past three decades has been narrow in scope and
published in article form. But see Todd Lochner, Dilemmas of Accountability: Prosecutorial
Agenda-Setting in United States Attorneys' Office (2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley) (on file with the Berkeley Library); See also Lochner, supra note 9, at
271-94. A handful of former AUSAs have written excellent articles on specific aspects of USAOs.
See, e.g., Bruce Green and Fred C. Zacharias, The Uniquenessof FederalProsecutors,88 GEO. L.J.
207 (2000); Michael O'Neill, When ProsecutorsDon't: Trends in Federal ProsecutorialDeclinations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV 221 (2003); H.W. Perry, United States Attorneys-Whom Shall They

Serve, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129 (1999); Daniel Richman, Prosecutorsand Their Agents,
Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (2003); Symposium: The ChangingRole of
the FederalProsecutor,26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347 (1999).

39. The Uncharted Territory Study, supra note 2, focused on the criminal disposition process
and differences among districts, not on USAO relations with Main Justice. Because this relationship
was not a focus of the research, information obtained about it was limited.
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The size of an office, more than anything, determined the ability of
a USAO to resist domination by Main Justice. Other things being equal,
the larger the office, the more robust its ability to develop the expertise to
handle complex litigation itself rather than relying on career attorneys
dispatched from Washington. Larger offices could shift AUSAs to cases
demanding more resources, whereas smaller offices could be overwhelmed by several major pending cases, forcing them to ask headquarters to dispatch DOJ attorneys to handle the work.
As noted earlier, in the 1960s and 1970s most USAOs were small.
With the expansion in the scope of federal criminal law, the number of
AUSAs increased dramatically. There were 4,155 full time equivalent
AUSA positions in fiscal year 1993,40 and the number has grown slowly
but steadily since then. By 2006, the DOJ reported that there were 5,673
full-time equivalent AUSA positions. 4 1 As a consequence, the number of
42
very large offices has increased dramatically.
The acquisition of quasi-civil service protection by AUSAs also
significantly enhanced field autonomy. In the mid-1960s to early 1970s,
the most serious problem in the representation of the federal government
in U.S. district courts was the inexperience of AUSAs.43 As previously
noted, AUSAs typically left about the time they gained the experience to
do their jobs well; positions with local law firms seeking attorneys with
litigation experience in federal court paid far more than the modest
salary AUSAs earned in government service. Even AUSAs who wished
to stay typically had to leave when party control of the presidency
changed.
This all changed dramatically when AUSAs were granted quasicivil service protection in the 1970s and their compensation was

40. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE., EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR U.S. ATT'YS, U.S. ATT'YS ANNUAL
STATISTICAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2002, at 3 (2002) [hereinafter U.S. ATT'YS ANNUAL
STATISTICAL REPORT 2002] (Overview Chart 1-Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) Personnel). The 1528
new positions added between FY 1993 and FY 2006 represent an increase of over 36 percent.
41. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR U.S. ATT'YS, U.S. ATT'YS ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT: FISCAL
YEAR 2006, at 3 (2006) [hereinafter U.S. ATT'YS ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT 2006] (Overview

Chart 1:Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) Personnel).
42. EISENSTEIN supra note 2, at 5 (citing 1968 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 93-94). In 1968, only
five USAOs had at least thirty-two Assistant U.S. Attorneys. The Southern District of New York
had sixty-seven, the District of Columbia forty-six, the Eastern District of New York thirty-two, the
Central District of California forty-three, and the Northern District of Illinois thirty-two. By contrast, in 2007, the average number of AUSAs per office was sixty-one. Some districts report the
number of AUSAs on their websites. See Executive Office for U.S. Att'ys, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/. In 2007, the Northern District of Illinois had 161 AUSAs, and
the Eastern District of New York more than 145. The Western District of Michigan alone had thirtyseven AUSAs, more than either of those two districts had in 1968.
43. EISENSTEIN, supra note 2, at 208.
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significantly raised. 44 Compared to prevailing incomes for lawyers in
many jurisdictions, the pay for AUSAs was quite poor. But beginning in
the mid-1970s, it has increased enough to attract a corps of career attorneys who stayed in the office.45 Today, a significant percentage of
AUSAs are career attorneys with considerable experience. In 2006, the
DOJ reported AUSAs had served an average of eleven years.4 6 Even in
large districts (where the pay AUSAs can command if they leave the of-

fice far exceeds their salary), a significant corps of assistants remain.
And the attractiveness of the position allows offices in such districts to
41
seek a commitment from new hires to stay at least four years.
44. AUSAs were evidently never explicitly granted civil service status. In 1978, Congress
passed Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified and amended as 5 U.S.C. § 1101), which in reforming the civil service laws, defined who was an "employee" entitled to a full set of protections.
See also 5 U.S.C. § 7513 (2006) (requiring 30 days notice, the right to an attorney, and a written
decision before they could be removed, suspended, or have their pay reduced). In Hamlett v. Dep't
of Justice, 90 M.S.P.R. 674 (2002), the Merit Systems Protection Board ruled that Hamlett, an
AUSA who was fired for misconduct, was entitled to the protections afforded civil service employees. Id.
45. Information on the pay of both U.S. Attorneys and AUSAs in public documents is surprisingly difficult to find. The DOJ's Office of Attorney Recruitment and Management states the pay of
attorneys hired by the USAOs is determined administratively, but it does not reveal what the pay
scale is. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Att'y Recruitment and Mgmt, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/oarm/arm/hp/hpsalary.htm (this web site states that "Attorneys hired by the
U.S. Attorneys' Offices are compensated under an Administratively Determined (AD) pay scale
authorized by Title 23, U.S. Code." The citation is probably in error, as Title 23 deals with highways.) The relevant provision of the U.S. Code, 28 U.S.C. § 548, specifies only that the Attorney
General makes the determination. 28 U.S.C. § 548 on "Salaries" reads,
[s]ubject to sections 5315 through 5317 of title 5, the Attorney General shall fix the annual salaries of United States attorneys, assistant United States attorneys, and attorneys
appointed under section 543 of this title at rates of compensation not in excess of the rate
of basic compensation provided for Executive Level IV of the Executive Schedule set
forth in section 5315 of title 5, United States Code.
28 U.S.C. § 548. However, the Office of Attorney Recruitment and Management does provide information on the pay of DOJ attorneys not hired by USAOs. A rough indication of current AUSA
pay can be obtained by assuming the two scales are roughly equivalent. Beginning DOJ attorneys
with just one year or less of experience begin at Grade GS- 11. In 2007, GS- 1 newcomers pay began at $46,974, with an upper limit of $61,068. The maximum salary for GS-15 attorneys at step 10
was

$120,981.

See U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT, FEDERAL CIVILIAN WORKFORCE

STATISTICS, PAY STRUCTURE OF THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE AS OF MARCH 31ST, 1997, SALARY

TABLE 2007-GS, available at http://www.opm.gov/oca/07tables/html/gs.asp. See also Lochner,
supranote 9, at 23, (citing a DOJ official's estimate that in 1998, the average AUSA salary, including cost of living supplements, was $88,244).
46. U.S. ATT'YS ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT, supra note 40, at 3; see also Todd Lochner,
Assistant U.S. Attorney Careerism and the Possibility of Agenda-Setting, (The Am. Political Sci.
Ass'n, Washington, D.C.) Winter 2000, at 7 (reporting that he calculated the average tenure of
AUSAs in the 1960s at about three years, rising to six years by the 1980s, and to over eight years in
the mid- 1990s).
47. UnchartedTerritory Study, supra note 2. The comments of an AUSA in a very large district interviewed in the study are instructive. When asked if he would consider making a career out
of federal prosecution, he replied:
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Communication among U.S. Attorneys and AUSAs expanded with
the increase in office size and AUSAs length of service. Interviews with
U.S. Attorneys in the mid-1960s and early 1970s revealed differences in
their understanding of how much discretion they could exercise and of
what recourse they had when they disagreed with Main Justice's directives. 48 As U.S. Attorneys came to know one another during an administration, especially at the annual conference of U.S. Attorneys in Washington, they began to share experience and tactics in dealing with the
DOJ. However, contact between U.S. Attorneys was infrequent, and
AUSAs from different districts rarely came to know one another. The
federalization of criminal law increased the need for meetings of field
personnel in order to deal with the multiple issues involving enforcement
of expanded federal criminal jurisdiction.
Moreover, the prosecution of criminal enterprises stretching across
many states necessitated the formation of multidistrict prosecution teams.
The DOJ began to call conferences of First Assistant U.S. Attorneys and
other supervisors in specialized areas (for example, terrorism and white
collar fraud). 49 In 1998, the DOJ established its National Advocacy Center in Columbia, South Carolina, where the Executive Office for U.S.
Attorneys and the Office of Legal Education run a number of training
of these proprograms for AUSAs. 50 The course descriptions for many
51
grams indicate that they bring together AUSAs annually.
No. No, in fact, this office requires people to sign on to a four year commitment. My
four years is coming up just a month and a half away and I am starting to think about
other career options .... [F]rankly, my view is that the time period you are here, an assistant should just commit him or herself entirely to the job. That means that you have to
understand going in that you are going to be giving up a lot. There is a huge amount of
sacrifice.
Id.
48. EISENSTEIN, supra note 2, at 64-67.

49. UnchartedTerritory Study, supra note 2. AUSAs occasionally mentioned these meetings
in interviews conducted as part of the study.
50. For a brief description of the National Advocacy Center, see Office of Legal Educ.
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/ole/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2007). This site reports that the National
District Attorneys Association uses the facilities to train state and local prosecutors, and that some
10,000 prosecutors attend the NAC each year. Id.
Money
Laundering
Seminar,
Course
Descriptions:
Advanced
51.
See
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/ole/olecourse calendar/descript.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2007).
The course description reads:
This seminar is designed for Assistant United States Attorneys (AUSAs) and Federal Investigative Agents with extensive experience in money laundering/asset forfeiture cases,
who are actively involved in the investigation and prosecution of money laundering/asset forfeiture cases. This is an annual conference, designed to to [sic] provide the
latest developments in the law, new agency initiatives, the banking and FinCen perspectives, and international money laundering. AUSAs are encouraged to nominate an investigating agent who will be involved in future investigations to attend this seminar.
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These contacts allowed communication networks and friendships
among AUSAs to develop across districts. 52 Some AUSAs acquire na-

tional reputations for expertise in their area, a development recognized
by the DOJ when it draws upon experienced career assistants to make
training videos and to teach seminars at the National Advocacy Institute. 5 3 Assistants participating in training seminars at the National Advocacy Center inevitably become acquainted with those leading the seminars as well as with their fellow participants from other districts, and can
seek advice and information from them rather than relying exclusively on
attorneys at Main Justice. These networks both reduce the need to rely
on Main Justice for help and provide channels to discuss other topics,
including DOJ efforts to control the discretion of attorneys in the field.54
The development of a cohort of experienced capable career AUSAs
stands in sharp contrast to the inexperience of AUSAs four decades ago.
Their level of expertise now very likely equals or exceeds that found in
Main Justice. Indeed, several interviewees in 2002 claimed that young5
attorneys in the DOJ sought to become AUSAs to gain experience,
something that was virtually unheard of in earlier times. Civil service
protection also makes it possible for AUSAs to transfer from one district
to another, strengthening ties between districts and enriching knowledge
of how districts deal with Main Justice.56 The presence of career
52. Uncharted TerritoryStudy, supra note 2. Interviewees mentioned these contacts, and occasionally received calls from people in other districts during the interviews. Communication between
districts has also been facilitated by the AUSAs who move from one district to another, a practice
unheard of in the past.
53. See Videotape, Ethics Training for Attorneys: Hard Drives and Hard Lessons (the National
Advocacy Center, Justice Television Network 2004) (describing the video as "AUSAs Edwin Kelly
and Eric Klumb explore the ethical issues surrounding the use of computers in litigation and
investigations.
(For DOJ Attorneys Only!)").
See also Videotape, Ethics, (the National
Advocacy Center, Justice Television Network) (featuring two AUSAs, one from the Middle
District of Pennsylvania, and one from Eastern District of Wisconsin). available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/ole/videoinfo/video descript.html#VO0148.
54. See U.S. ATT'Ys ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT 2002, supra note 40, at 3; U.S. Arr'YS
ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT 2006, supra note 41, at 3. It is also worth nothing that Main Justice's
ability to oversee AUSAs has in relative terms declined as the number of AUSAs increased faster
than the number of attorneys working in Washington. In FY 2002, 53% of the DOJ's attorneys and
67% of those whose duties involved prosecution or litigation served in USAOs; by FY 2006, these
numbers were 56% and 70% respectively.
55. UnchartedTerritory Study, supra note 2.
56. Id. Several AUSAs interviewed in 2002 had served in other districts, and provided good
insight into how offices differed. The career of Ronald Tenpas illustrates these new patterns nicely.
See FeaturedMadisonian: RonaldJ. Tenpas, Alumnus, James Madison College at Mich. State University, http://www.jmc.msu.edu/mom/showmom.asp?id=22, (last visited Aug. 27, 2007);
United States Department of Justice, Environment and Natural Resources Division,
http://www.usdoj.gov/enrd/ (last visited Aug. 27, 2007). Tenpas was an AUSA in the Middle
District of Florida, an AUSA and a Branch Chief in Maryland, and United States Attorney for the
Southern District of Illinois. He then became Associate Deputy Attorney General, and finally be-
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attorneys who take pride in their skills, regard themselves as at least as
knowledgeable and experienced as attorneys at Main Justice, and adhere
to their offices' traditions of independence, all promote autonomy from
DOJ control. 57 Put simply, most USAOs have the means, motives, and

opportunity to make their own decisions about what cases to bring and
how to handle them.
The Attorney General's Advisory Committee of U.S. Attorneys has
also contributed to greater autonomy. Prior to 1973, no regular mechanism existed for U.S. Attorneys to bring their concerns directly to the top
leadership of the DOJ. The Executive Office for United States Attorneys had a responsibility to transmit concerns from the field to Main Justice.58 But U.S. Attorneys had to take it upon themselves if they wanted
to discuss policy and practices with either the Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General. That changed when Attorney General Elliot
Richarson announced the formation of the Attorney General's Advisory
Committee (AGAC). 59 The seventeen members of the AGAC, appointed
by the Attorney General to be representative of the diversity among offices, provide an opportunity to voice opinions about policy and offer
advice to the Attorney General. 60 This access provided a counterweight
came Acting Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Environment and Natural Resources Division. Id.
57. The degree of pride federal prosecutors express in the quality of their office is striking.
Attorneys in three large districts asserted that they were the premier office in the country, providing
ample grounds for not automatically deferring to judgments and directives from Main Justice.
Uncharted Territory Study, supra note 2. Sometimes, office pride is revealed in USAOs' websites.
The Northern District of Illinois (Chicago and vicinity) web site proclaims:
The United States Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Illinois is one of the
premier federal prosecutors' offices in the country. Its outstanding reputation and tradition of excellence is based, in part, on famous undercover investigations and prosecutions of public corruption in Chicago and Cook County, such as Operation Greylord and
Operation Gambat, which targeted judicial corruption, and, more recently, Operation
Haunted Hall, Operation Silver Shovel and Operation Safe Road, which focused on political corruption.
Illinois,
District
of
Northern
Attorney's
Office,
United
States
See
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/iln/aboutus/index.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2007). The development of
a core of career Assistants adds a potentially significant complicating factor in assessing Main Justice/U.S. Attorney relations that is not addressed in this Article. See Lochner, supra note 9, at 287
(quoting a former U.S. Attorney regarding how prosecutorial policies are set: "We have seen a move
towards more cohesiveness between U.S. attorneys and the higher-ups at Justice. The real tension
oftentimes isn't between the offices and Main Justice, but rather Main Justice and the U.S. Attorneys
on the one hand and career assistants on the other.").
58. For a discussion of the ambiguous and uncomfortable role the Executive Office for U.S.
Attorneys played in the relationship between the DOJ's field offices and headquarters see
EISENSTEIN, supranote 2, at 92-93.
59. For a description of the history, composition, and functions of the AGAC, see MANUAL,
supra note 6, at 3-2.000
60. MANUAL, supra note 6, at 3-2.250, 3-2.530.
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to their frequent rivals, the Assistant Attorneys General who enjoy easy
access to the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General.
Finally, the vast expansion in the scope of crimes falling within the
jurisdiction of the federal criminal justice system, a development termed
"the federalization of criminal law," both promoted the increase in the
number of AUSAs and expanded opportunities for USAOs to exercise
discretion. Over the past thirty years, the American criminal justice system has gradually but steadily been transformed from one in which the
states determined the content of almost all criminal law and had
jurisdiction over the prosecution of the crimes defined under it, to an increasingly federalized system. 6' The growth in federal criminal jurisdiction necessitated hiring additional AUSAs. The federalization of criminal law meant that with few exceptions, crimes that were traditionally
only subject to state jurisdiction became federal offenses as well. The
number of cases handled by USAOs consequently rose. In 1965, approximately 31,000 criminal cases were filed.62 By 2005, almost 69,000
federal criminal cases were filed, more than double the 1965 figure. The
quantum leap in the overlap between federal and state jurisdiction required U.S. Attorneys to develop closer ties to state and local law enforcement.6 3 It also increased the scope of discretion in deciding what
cases to prosecute. The result was additional responsibility for U.S. Attorneys in the district, responsibilities that had to be fulfilled by people
working in the district.

61. For a useful overview of these developments, see JAMES A. STRAZELLA, THE
FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, (A.B.A. Crim. Just. Sec.) (1998); see also Gerald G. Ashdown,
Federalism,Federalization,and the Politics of Crime, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 789, 789-813 (1996); Sara
Sun Beale, Reporter's Draft for the Working Group on Principles to Use When Considering the
Federalization of Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1277, 1277-1304 (1995); Charles D. Bonner,
The Federalizationof Crime: Too Much of a Good Thing?, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 905, 905-38 (1998);
Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46
HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1135-74 (1995); Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalizationof
CriminalLaw, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 643, 643-735 (1997); Zachary W. Carter, et al. PanelDiscussion:
The Prosecutor'sRole in Light of Expanding Federal CriminalJurisdiction,26 FOROHAM URB. L.J.
657, 657-77 (1999); Daniel C. Richman, The Changing Boundaries Between Federaland Local Law
Enforcement, in BOUNDARY CHANGES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE ORGANIZATIONS 81-111 (Charles M.

Friel ed., 2000).
Justice
Statistics
Online,
62.
Source
Book
of
Criminal
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t592005.pdf, table 5.9.2005 (last visited Aug. 26, 2007).
The number stayed in the range of 30,000 to 33,500 through 1969. It jumped to over 38,000 in
1970, and ranged between 28,000 and 47,000 until 1986, when it consistently topped 40,000. Id.
63. For an example of the nature of these ties, see Lisa L. Miller and James Eisenstein, The
Federal/StateCriminal ProsecutionNexus: A Case Study in Cooperationand Discretion,30 LAW &

SOC. INQUIRY 239, 239-68 (2005).
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B. FactorsPromoting Main Justice Control of USA Os
Though developments since the 1970s generally promoted greater
autonomy for USAOs, some forces acted to counter this general trend.
As described in greater detail below, the Senate seemed less inclined to
exert its traditional prerogatives in the appointment and removal of U.S.
Attomeys. The DOJ increased its demands on USAOs for reports on
their activities. The implementation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines prompted Main Justice to establish national standards regarding
their application, including the Thornburgh Memo, which regulated
charging decisions.64 The increased attention to law and order issues,
including the death penalty, the war on drugs, and other crimes (for example, carjacking) both promoted the federalization of criminal law and
increased the DOJ's efforts under both Democratic and Republican administrations alike to undertake nationwide initiatives to deal with these
crimes.
After the election of George W. Bush, several significant developments strengthened the factors that favored greater control of U.S. Attorneys by Main Justice.6 5 One such development consisted of successful
attempts to change the type of people who headed USAOs. Efforts by
the DOJ to reduce the role the Senate played in the appointment of U.S.
Attorneys were a second. Third, the political leadership of the DOJ exhibited less deference to the value of U.S. Attorney autonomy. Finally,
several other developments, including the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001 and policies toward death penalty cases, resulted in greater central control.
1. Changes in Who Became U.S. Attorneys
The Bush Administration, especially under Alberto Gonzales, undertook an unprecedented, determined, and multi-faceted effort to appoint U.S. Attorneys who identified with Main Justice's goals, accepted
its authority, and actively sought to implement its policies and directives.
Support for President Bush appears to have been salient both in determining who should be fired and who hired. The New York Times reported that Attorney General Gonzales' Deputy Chief of Staff, Kyle
Sampson, sent a ranking of U.S. Attorneys to White House Counsel Harriet Miers in March 2005, which recommended retaining "strong" U.S.
64. See infra, note 98 and accompanying text for a further discussion of the Thomburgh Memo.
65. Efforts at enhanced control by Main Justice predated the Bush Administration. Norman
Abrams and Sara Sun Beale claimed that Main Justice was seeking to "exercise greater supervisory
control over decision-making by United States Attorneys in the field, with a view to making federal
prosecutive policy more uniform nationwide." NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 8 (2d ed. 1993).
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Attorneys who "have produced, managed well, and exhibited loyalty to
the President and Attorney General," and firing "weak U.S. Attorneys
who had been ineffectual managers and prosecutors, chafed against administration initiatives, etc." 66 The New York Times later reported that he
also produced a chart of possible nominees that included a category for
membership in the conservative Federalist Society, for work on Republi67
can campaigns, and for serving as a delegate to the GOP's Convention.
In replying to a string of emails that discussed why all U.S. Attorneys
should not be removed, Sampson said, "we would like to replace 1520% of the current U.S. Attorneys-the underperforming ones .... The
vast majority of U.S. Attorneys, 80-85%, I would guess, are doing a
68
great job, are loyal Bushies, etc., etc."5
A number of newspaper articles claimed that many new U.S. Attorneys in 2006 lacked either prosecutorial experience or strong ties to the
district to which they were appointed. One newspaper report drawing on
e-mail messages provided to Congress reported that Kyle Sampson proposed thirty-three-year-old Rachel Brand as the replacement for Margaret Chiara, the U.S. Attorney in Western Michigan, despite the fact that
Brand had no prosecutorial experience. 69 Brand headed the DOJ's Office
of Legal Policy and had been active in the Federalist Society, and though
born in Michigan, grew up in Iowa7 0 Although a newcomer to the district, Deborah Rhoades, an appointed U.S. Attorney in the Southern District of Alabama, was an experienced prosecutor who served as a trial
attorney for the Philadelphia Organized Crime Strike Force and an
AUSA in San Diego before moving to Main Justice as Counselor to the
Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division.71 Others, such as
Bradley J. Schlozman, appointed as interim head of the Western District

66. David Johnston & Eric Lipton, 'Loyalty' to Bush and Gonzales Was Factorin Prosecutors'
Firings, E-MailShows, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2007, at A18.

67. Id.
68. Dan Eggen & Paul Kane, Justice Dept. Would Have Kept 'Loyal' Prosecutors;Aide Recommended Retaining 'Bushies'And Top Performers,WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 2007, at A2. According
to a Talking Points Memo, "U.S. Attorney Purge Timeline," Sampson stated: "In my c-mails, by
referring to loyal Bushies or loyalty to the President or the Attorney General, I meant loyalty to their
policies and the priorities they had laid out for US Attorneys." U.S. Attorney Purge Timeline,
TALKING POINTS MEMO, http://www.talkingpointsmemo.conusa-timeline.php (last visited Nov. 12,
2007).
69. Scott Shane, Political Resume, Not Court, Stood Out for a Contender, N. Y. TIMES, Apr.
14, 2007, at AI0. Brand ultimately declined to accept the nomination.
70. Id.

71. This information is from the official biography on the U.S. Attorney's Office's web site,
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/als/usattorney/index.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2007).
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of Missouri and his replacement, John Wood, had never served as a
prosecutor.72
The Washington Post reported in 2007 that after Bush's re-election
in 2004, almost four dozen new U.S. Attorneys had been selected, with
nearly one-third of them "trusted Administration insiders., 73 Twenty
came to office as interim appointees who, thanks to a provision of an
amendment to the Patriot Act inspired by the DOJ in 2006, 74 could serve
indefinitely without the need for the President to submit a nominee to the
Senate for confirmation. Consequently, over 40% (twenty of forty-eight)
of U.S. Attorneys who came to office after Bush's 2004 election were
interim appointees.75
Thus, a significant number of U.S. Attorneys serving in 2007 either
came from posts within the Administration in Washington, D.C. or
lacked strong ties to their districts and the prestige accruing to individuals formally nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate.76
Their willingness to devote resources to prosecutions for crimes not a
priority for Washington and their ability and inclination to resist efforts
to reduce district autonomy coming from Main Justice were both impaired compared to U.S. Attorneys with permanent appointments, strong
ties to their districts, and prosecutorial experience.77
72. Wood's prior experience included serving as Deputy Associate Attorney General and as a
Counselor to Attorney General John D. Ashcroft, Deputy General Counsel for the Office of
Management and Budget, and Chief of Staff for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. He was
born in Missouri and served as an aide to Republican Senator John Danforth. U.S. Attorney's Office, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/mow/aboutus/usattomey.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2007). Schlozman was Acting Assistant Attorney in the voting rights section of the Civil Rights Division.
73. Amy Goldstein & Dan Eggen, Prosecutor Posts Go To Bush Insiders: Less Preference
Shown for Locals, Senators' Choices, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2007, at Al. The vacancies resulted
both from firings and natural turnover and included twenty interim appointments made by the DOJ
along with nominees submitted to the Senate for confirmation. The article reports the appointees
included ten people who served as senior aides to Gonzales as well as several from the White House
and other federal agencies. Some of the appointees lacked prosecutorial experience, ties to the district, or both. They included Bradley Schlozman, interim USA in the Western District of Missouri,
who was a deputy in the Civil Rights Division; John Wood, nominated to replace Schlozman while a
counselor to then-Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty; Rachel Paulose, Senior Counselor to
McNulty; and three close associates of John Ashcroft. Id.
74. See infra note 86.
75. Amy Goldstein & Dan Eggen, Prosecutor Posts Go To Bush Insiders; Less Preference
Shown for Locals, Senators' Choices, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2007 at Al.
76. The field research for Counselfor the United States found that acting U.S. Attorneys suffered several disadvantages in running their offices. They found it difficult to undertake major initiatives or reorganization of the office because everyone was waiting for the permanent appointee to
assume control. The cachet of being a presidential appointee provided intangible but important
prestige that enhanced their ability to lead, something interim or acting U.S. Attorneys lacked.
EISENSTEIN, supra note 2.

77. In some districts, counter-pressures to assert district autonomy might be at work, especially
in USAOs with a vibrant office culture embraced by a strong core of career AUSAs that extols inde-
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This increased reliance on political loyalty and service to the Administration does not mean that all or even most nominees lacked prosecutorial experience or ties to their districts, or that their political loyalty
was their principal qualification. Indeed, according to two reporters who
studied the characteristics of nominees, "the majority of the U.S. attorneys named since 2005 have been relatively traditional choices, such as
career prosecutors who moved up to the top job in the district in which
they worked. 7 8 But the use of political criteria and service in Washington in selecting U.S. Attorneys in the Bush Administration is unprecedented in the modern era. 9
2. Diminished Deference to the Senate
in U.S. Attorney Appointments
The Administration's expanded use of political criteria in choosing
U.S. Attorneys indicates that it was less inclined to defer to senators in
the appointment process.80 Hints that this was the case emerged from
documents released as a result of congressional inquiries into the November 2006 firings of U.S. Attorneys. In e-mails, the Attorney General's Deputy Chief of Staff, Kyle Sampson, listed the names of possible
replacements for U.S. Attorneys being considered for dismissal instead
of waiting for senators' or state party officials' recommendations. 81 In
2001, the District Court in Maine appointed Paula Silsby as Acting U.S.
Attorney. The President failed to submit a nominee to the Senate, despite Republican Senator Olympia Snowe's recommendation that Silsby
be appointed.8 2 While senators and other political figures still play a
pendence from Washington, and in districts where the federal court community as a whole values
local autonomy and distrusts Washington.
78. Goldstein & Eggen, supra note 73.
79. For example, the Washington Post quoted former Clinton Administration Deputy Attorney

General Jamie Gorelick as saying that Justice Department officials only rarely became U.S. Attorneys. "These jobs are serious prosecutorial jobs that require judgment and an understanding of the
laws that are to be enforced. They are not meant to be stepping-stones, or to give people turns at
political jobs." Goldstein & Eggen, supranote 73.
80. In e-mails released by the DOJ, the Attorney General's Chief of Staff, Kyle Sampson, was
explicit on this point: "I am in favor of executing on a plan to push some USAs out.... I strongly
recommend that as a matter of administration, we utilize the new statutory provisions that authorize
the AG to make USA appointments." Sampson further said that by avoiding Senate confirmation,
"we can give far less deference to home state senators and thereby get (1) our preferred person appointed and (2) do it far faster and more efficiently at less political costs to the White House.
Talking
Points
Memo,
U.S.
Attorney
Purge
Timeline,
May
14,
2007,
http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/usa-timeline.php. For a description of the considerable influence senators exerted on the appointment of U.S. Attorneys in the 1960s and 1970s, see EiSENSTEIN,
supranote 2, at 41-45.
8 1. ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 65.
82. Dan Eggen & Amy Goldstein, Justice Weighted Firing I in 4, WASH. POST, May 17, 2007,

at A1. Silsby continued to serve as acting U.S. Attorney into 2007.
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significant role in the appointment and retention of U.S. Attorneys, the

actual influence of the Senate in the selection of U.S. Attorneys seems to
have declined.

Fewer senators now seem to have a sense of entitlement in influencing who becomes U.S. Attorney.83 The frequency with which individu-

als without strong ties to their districts have been nominated and confirmed suggests an erosion of the traditional, widely shared understanding that U.S. Attorneys should be well known and respected in their dis-

tricts, and knowledgeable about them. We can therefore infer that senators are less willing to assert their traditional prerogative to participate
meaningfully in the appointment process. The same may be said of what

apparently are the relatively muted protests of Republican senators from
the states where U.S. Attorneys have been fired.84 It would be incorrect
to conclude that senators and other politicians now play only minor roles

83. Alabama's two Republican Senators, Jeff Sessions and Richard Shelby, reportedly had
someone else in mind for the Southern District of Alabama, but agreed to support Deborah Rhodes,
who had served as counselor in Main Justice's criminal division, even though they had never met or
heard of her. See Goldstein & Eggen, supra note 73. In August 2006, the DOJ appointed as Interim
U.S. Attorney for Alaska an AUSA from Pittsburgh without input from its two Republican Senators.
Senator Murkowski, who recommended the first Assistant in Anchorage, reported that the DOJ said
that they were still working on it when asked about the status of her recommendation; she then stated
that the picks "were not acceptable by the White House." Finally, upon hearing the news of the
interim appointment she declared, "[y]ou just think, it can't be, wait. There was no consulting, nor
process, no nothing. That's where I was certainly caught blindsided." Richard Mauer, U.S. Scandal
Threatens Alaska's Prosecutor, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Apr. 22, 2007, available at
87
http://www.adn.com/news/alaska/story/8816351 p- 17151 c.html. Ted Stevens, the longest serving
Republican in the Senate and considered one of the most powerful senators in Washington, was
quoted as saying, "I am just furious at the way the attorney general handled this." Id.
84. Though five of the nine fired U.S. Attorneys served in states with two Democratic senators
(Lam and Ryan in California, McKay in Washington, Cummins in Arkansas, and Chiara in Michigan), three had one Republican Senator (Graves in Missouri, Bogden in Nevada, and Iglesias in New
Mexico), and one (Charlton in Arizona) had two Republican Senators. David Johnston and Eric
Lipton reported that Senator Ensign (R-NV) was very unhappy about the decision to fire Bogden.
Johnson & Lipton, supra note 66. Reacting to emails released by the DOJ stating Senator Kyl was
upset at the firing of Paul Charlton, a Kyl spokesman told the Associated Press, "Kyl was not at all
pleased with the way the Justice Department conducted its dismissal of several U.S. Attorneys, including Paul Charlton from Arizona. Kyl supported Mr. Charlton's nomination. And when informed of the DOJ's decision to dismiss him, Kyl requested that the Justice Department reconsider
its decision." The Associated Press, E-mails: Kyl 'Upset' Over ProsecutorFiring,TUCSON CITIZEN,
Aug. 3, 2007, available at http://www.tucsoncitizen.com/ss/local/59120.php.
Neither Ensign nor Kyl spoke out publicly about the firings. It is interesting that Senator
Domenici, who recommended David Iglesias be appointed U.S. Attorney in New Mexico, also
played a role in his firing, complaining about Iglesias' failure to prosecute voter fraud cases in three
phone calls to the Attorney General, and eventually calling Iglesias at home to ask about charges in a
corruption case involving a Democrat. Christopher Drew & Eric Lipton, Anger of Swing State RepublicansEased U.S. Attorney Toward Exit, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2007, at 1.
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in the appointment and retention of U.S. Attorneys.85 But the likelihood
that their role has declined is intriguing and, if true, important.
The strongest evidence for both the Bush Administration's diminished regard for the role of the Senate and the Senate's acceptance of a
lesser role rests in the changes made in provisions for the appointment of
interim U.S. Attorneys in the Patriot Act Reauthorization Bill signed into
law by President Bush in March 2006. At the behest of the Administration during Conference Committee deliberations on the bill, a Republican
Senate Judiciary Committee staffer inserted a provision that changed the
long standing requirement that an interim U.S. Attorney selected by the
DOJ could not serve for more than 120 days. 86 Under the new provision,
interim U.S. Attorneys could continue to serve indefinitely. This meant
that the DOJ could unilaterally determine who would replace a departing

U.S. Attorney and bypass the Senate entirely. After the controversy over
85. Writing on the website TRUTHOUT.org, Michael Winship speculated that the reason Steven
Biskupic, the U.S. Attorney in Eastern Wisconsin, one of the places identified as a voter-fraud "hot
spot," survived was due to the Administration's fear of angering the then-Chair of the House Judiciary Committee, James Sensenbrenner. U.S. Attorneys in Pennsylvania, another state where the there
were GOP allegations of voter fraud, also stayed in office, perhaps due to the influence of Senator
Arlen Specter, the Senate Judiciary Chair in 2006. Michael Winship, Keep Out the Vote, TRUTHOUT,
May 15, 2007, http://www.truthout.org/docs_2006/051507D.shtml. The L.A. Times described the
little known bi-partisan "California Commission" headed by a wealthy Bush ally (Gerald L. Parsky)
which was created in a deal between the Administration and California's two Democratic senators to
recommend candidates for U.S. Attorney positions and federal judgeships. Richard B. Schmitt,
Goodling: A PowerPlayerBehind the Scenes at the JusticeDept., L.A. TiMES, May 23, 2007. When
Kyle Sampson and Monica Goodling sought to end-run the Commission by finding their own candidates, Parksy complained. Id.
86. The relevant portion of the bill reads:
SEC. 502. INTERIM APPOINTMENT OF UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS. Section
546 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by striking subsections c) and d) and inserting the following new subsection: c) A person appointed as United States attorney
under this section may serve until the qualification of a United States Attorney for such
district appointed by the President under section 541 of this title.
Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 502, 120 Stat. 192 (2006). Senator Specter, Judiciary Committee Chairman
when the change was made, claimed he did not know about the provision:
I then contacted my very able chief counsel, Michael O'Neill, to find out exactly what
had happened. And Mr. O'Neill advised me that the requested change had come from the
Department of Justice, that it had been handled by Brett Tolman, who is now the U.S. attorney for Utah, and that the change had been requested by the Department of Justice...
Dahlia Lithwick, U.S. Attorney Scandal Update: Who's to Blame for Those Alarming Patriot Act
Revisions?, SLATE, Mar. 5, 2007.

The 120-day limit on the term of acting U.S. Attorneys

dates from 1986. According to Judiciary Committee Chair Senator Patrick Leahy, "[b]efore 1986,
28 U.S.C. § 546, the law governing the appointment of United States Attorneys, authorized the
district court where a vacancy exists to appoint a person to serve until the President appointed
a person to fill that vacancy with the advice and consent of the Senate." Preserving United States
Attorney Independence Act of 2007: HearingBefore the S. JudiciaryComm. on S. 214, 110th Cong.
(Feb.
8,
2007)
(statement
of
Sen.
Patrick
Leahy),
available
at
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200702/020807.html.
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the firings of nine U.S. Attorneys erupted, Congress repealed this provi-

sion in 2007.87 However, by then, approximately twenty interim U.S.
Attorneys had been selected by the DOJ.88
Increasing the DOJ's control over who becomes a U.S. Attorney to

ensure responsiveness to Main Justice's priorities and directives greatly
enhances its ability to reduce local autonomy. The success the DOJ had

in increasing its role in determining who headed USAOs, especially in
the Gonzales era, likely meant fewer U.S. Attorneys sought a degree of
autonomy, and more of them consciously strived to follow Main Justice's lead faithfully. This change is particularly significant because it
occurred in the middle of the Administration's second term, a period
where U.S. Attorneys' autonomy typically rose.
3. Main Justice's Reduced Acceptance

of U.S. Attorney Autonomy
Attitudes in Main Justice toward the degree of autonomy that U.S.
Attorneys rightfully ought to exercise shifted. Information that came to
light as the controversy over the firings grew suggests political appointees in the Bush Administration's DOJ may not have adhered as strongly

to the pre-existing consensus that a degree of U.S. Attorney autonomy
was necessary and desirable. 89 Likewise, the desire to preside over a

87. The Senate passed the Preserving United States Attorney Independence Act of 2007
by a vote of 94-2, and the House by 306-144. See http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d1 10:SN00214:@@@R (last visited Aug. 31, 2007). President Bush signed it into
law on June 14, 2007, as announced in a two sentence White House News Release. See
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/06/20070614-6.html. As a result, the interim U.S.
Attorneys already in office became subject to the 120-day limit.
88. This was not the only provision in the Patriot Act Reauthorization strengthening the DOJ's
ability to influence who served as U.S. Attorneys. According to the Washington Post, the U.S. Attorney for Montana, William Mercer, raised the ire of the Chief District Judge in Billings, Donald W.
Molloy, because Mercer was spending most of his time in Washington D.C. as an aide to Attorney
General Gonzales. Judge Molloy claimed that because Mercer was living in Washington, he was no
longer a Montana resident, in violation of federal law. Mercer asked the counsel to Judiciary Committee Chair Arlen Specter to insert a provision in the law allowing federal prosecutors to reside
outside of their districts if they have "dual or additional" responsibilities. Dan Eggen, Residency
Clause Adds Fuel to Dispute Over U.S. Attorneys, WASH. POST, May 2, 2007, at A3. The article
claims that "about a half-dozen" U.S. Attorneys worked in Washington, an ironic fact given the
DOJ's contention that one reason David Iglesias was fired as New Mexico's U.S. Attorney was
because he was absent from his district too often and that Mercer spent an average of three days a
month in Montana. Id.
89. One indication of attitudes within Main Justice came in an e-mail that one official, Bill
Mercer, wrote in response to a colleague who said he was "sad." David Johnson & John M. Broder,
New E-Mail Gives Details on Attorney Dismissals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2007, at A2. Mercer suggested some reasons to be sad:
That Carol Lam (the fired U.S. Attorney in San Diego) can't meet a deadline or that
you'll need to interact with her in the coming weeks or that she won't just say: Okay.
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unified DOJ with U.S. Attorneys following its policy initiatives may
have been more central to Bush's top appointees. Historically, comprehensive reviews of U.S. Attorneys' performance to determine who
should be fired have probably never been conducted. When Main Justice
did just that, it constituted an extraordinary break with past practice. In
an Op-Ed piece in the New York Times, Attorney General Gonzales referred to this review as a "management review process," suggesting that
such reviews were no longer out of the ordinary in the eyes of Main Justice. 90 Together, these changes in attitudes reinforced a belief within the
DOJ that failure to obey91its instructions in specific cases provides sufficient grounds for firing.
Further evidence of the determination of Main Justice to control the
U.S. Attorneys rests in the unprecedented firings themselves and what
the emails that were subsequently released revealed about the attitude in
Main Justice toward the tenure of U.S. Attorneys. They suggest that
consideration of removal of U.S. Attorneys was a routine topic of discussion. Talk of U.S. Attorneys who might be fired, unlike past practice,
was not confined to a single individual or office as problems arose, but
rather was a discussion initiated within the DOJ by political appointees
with close ties to the White House, and perhaps involving White House
officials themselves. 92 At one time or another, Kyle Sampson considered
some twenty-six U.S. Attorneys for dismissal.9 3
You got me. You're right, I've ignored national priorities and obvious local needs.
Shoot, more production is more hideous than I realized.
Id.
90. Alberto Gonzales, 'Nothing Improper', N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 15, 2007, at B7. Gonzales also

said that "[w]hat began as a well-intentioned management effort to identify where, among the ninetythree U.S. attorneys, changes in leadership might benefit the Department, and therefore the American
people, has become an unintended public controversy." Id.
91. David Johnston and Eric Lipton reported some of the reasons for the firings given by Kyle
Sampson, the Attorney General's Deputy Chief of Staff, in the e-mails. Johnston & Lipton, supra
note 66. The e-mails contained criticism of Paul Charlton (Arizona) and Daniel Bogden (Nevada)
for being "unwilling to take good cases we have presented to them." Id. Of Charlton, the memos
also cited "[r]epeated instances of insubordination, actions taken contrary to instructions, and actions
that were clearly unauthorized."

Memo Tries to Justify Attorney Firings, UPI, Mar. 21, 2007,

http://www.upi.com/NewsTrack/TopNews/2007/03/2 I/memo tries tojustifyattomeyfirings/764
/.
Traditionally, DOJ officials did not believe they should dictate what cases U.S. Attorneys
brought. According to John R. Schmidt, a Clinton Administration Department Official, "[tihe fundamental difference should be the difference between policy and anything that relates to prosecution
of individual cases." Liptak, supra note 27.
92. For example, Kyle Sampson wrote in an e-mail to the White House about a "real problem
we have right now with Carol Lam [U.S. Attorney in San Diego]" and urged that a search for a repl acement begin. Dan Eggen, Prosecutor'sFiring Was UrgedDuring Probe, WASH. POST, Mar. 19,

2007, at A3.
93. See Dan Eggen & Amy Goldstein, Justice Weighed Firing I in 4: 26 Prosecutors Were
Listed As Candidates, WASH. POST, May 17, 2007, at Al. For a list of the twenty-six, see Memos
Suggested DOJfire 26 U.S. Attorneys, Staff Reports, WASH. POST, May 17, 2007, at A1.
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4. Other Developments Promoting Central Control
The government's response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist at-

tacks provided a major impetus for central coordination of anti-terrorism
investigations and prosecutions. 94 USAOs recognized the need for coordination of investigations and prosecutions that spanned district boundaries and very likely reduced resistance to increased scrutiny and control

in terrorism cases that would have met with strong resentment in other
areas of law enforcement prior to September 11. 95 But the need for Main
Justice to be involved in the investigation and prosecution of other

crimes that increasingly involved defendants operating across district
(and even international) boundaries in the past three decades also likely
led to increased efforts at central control and field acceptance of that control. Unlike the situation in the early 1970s, many drug manufacturing
and distribution networks, juvenile gang activities, and health care fraud

schemes (among others) now extend across multiple districts. Prosecuting such crimes requires tight coordination of investigations and indictments in multiple districts.
A second development increased central control. Beginning with
John Ashcroft, Main Justice sought and largely achieved significant centralization in death penalty cases. All death penalty eligible cases had to
be forwarded to Washington D.C., regardless of whether the USAO
wished to seek the death penalty or not.96 Furthermore, the final
94. Law Professor Peter S. Margulies of Roger Williams University observed, "[a] crisis like
the Sept. II attacks creates the occasion for a monolithic model for law enforcement and national
security. It creates a lot of pressure for a top-down model. That includes even traditionally autonomous actors like U.S. attorneys." Liptak, supra note 27.
95. As September II receded in time, the emphasis on terrorism investigations also declined
from the peak it reached in 2002. According to one study,
[i]n the twelve months immediately after 9/11, the prosecution of individuals the government classified as international terrorists surged sharply higher than in the previous
year. But timely data show that five years later, in the latest available period, the total
number of these prosecutions has returned to roughly what they were just before the attacks.
Criminal Terrorism Enforcement in the United States During the Five Years Since the 9/11/01 Attacks, TRAC REPORTS, http://www.trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/169/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2007).
The study found that the number of prosecutions rose from 55 to 355 from 2001 to 2002, but
dropped back to 66 by 2003. Id. The decline in terrorism prosecutions may have reduced the contribution the oversight of terrorism investigations made to the overall degree of central control of
USAOs.
96. The U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, § 9-10.040: General Process Leading to the Attorney
General's Determination reads:
In all cases subject to the provisions of this Chapter, the Attorney General will make the
final decision about whether to seek the death penalty. The Attorney General will convey the final decision to the United States Attorney in a letter authorizing him or her to
seek or not to seek the death penalty.
MANUAL, supra note 6. Previously, U.S. Attorneys only needed approval if they wanted to seek the
death penalty.
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decision on whether to seek death or not was reserved for the DOJ. For
example, Paul Charlton, the fired U.S. Attorney in Arizona, claimed in
an interview that he was "ordered" to seek the death penalty in the case
of a methamphetamine dealer named Rios Rico.97 This policy resulted in
a major centralization of authority in a highly visible and important area
of criminal law. We do not know the extent to which the DOJ, from
Carter through Clinton, expanded its scope of control over prosecutorial
decisions. We do know that with the implementation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in 1987, the DOJ sought to standardize charging decisions in criminal cases. Under the Thornburgh Memo, USAOs were instructed to charge the most serious provable offense in order to minimize
inter-district variation in the implementation of the Sentencing Guidelines. 98 This reduced a USAO's discretion in filing charges. 99
A final development favoring central control consisted of efforts by
both Congress and the DOJ to restrict the way USAOs allocated their
AUSAs by tying the allocation of new positions to the prosecution of
specific crimes.' 00 Receiving additional AUSA slots was contingent on
97. Jason Leopold, Former US Attorney Wary of Gonzales's New Powers, Aug. 15, 2007,
available at http://www.truthout.org/docs 2006/081507J.shtml. Charlton asked to talk to the Attorney General about the case, but was refused.
98. Then-Attorney General Richard Thornburgh, himself a former U.S. Attorney, issued the
memo on June 8, 1989, in preparation for the Sentencing Guidelines taking effect. The original
memo has been superseded several times since then. For example, John Ashcroft distributed a memo
to U.S. Attorneys on September 22, 2003, to update policy regarding charging decisions in light of
passage of the PROTECT Act earlier that year. Its key provision, which preserves the policy established by Thornburgh reads as follows:
Department Policy Concerning Charging and Prosecution of Criminal Offenses. A. General Duty to Charge and to Pursue the Most Serious, Readily Provable Offense in All
Federal Prosecutions. It is the policy of the Department of Justice that, in all federal
criminal cases, federal proscutors must charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable offense or offenses that are supported by the facts of the case, except as authorized
by an Assistant Attorney General, United States Attorney, or designated supervisory attorney in the limited circumstances described below. The most serious offense or offenses are those that generate the most substantial sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines, unless a mandatory minimum sentence or count requiring a consecutive sentence
would generate a longer sentence. A charge is not "readily provable" if the prosecutor
has a good faith doubt, for legal or evidentiary reasons, as to the Government's ability
readily to prove a charge at trial. Thus, charges should not be filed simply to exert leverage to induce a plea. Once filed, the most serious readily provable charges may not be
dismissed except to the extent permitted in Section B.
Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft to the U.S. Attorneys on the
Federal
Sentencing
Guidelines
(Sept.
22,
2003),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag 516.htm.
99. Field interviews in USAOs in seven districts in the study cited in the UnchartedTerritory
Study, supra note 2, found that these offices were strongly committed to adhere to the requirement
that the most serious provable offense be charged.
100. For example, a press release from Alabama Homeland Security in 2006 announced that
the DOJ was adding twenty AUSAs to border districts to "prosecute only immigration-related of-
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USAOs devoting their efforts to prosecuting child pornography, gun
crimes, immigration, or drug cases.1 °1 As the number of AUSAs
increased, so did the number of training programs for them. Supervisors,
especially First Assistant U.S. Attorneys, as well as other AUSAs now
meet together, providing the DOJ with opportunities to extol the virtues
of uniform national policy. Furthermore, as noted earlier, many assistants attend the DOJ's training school at the National Advocacy Center
in South Carolina, creating another opportunity for indoctrination by
Main Justice. 10 2 Finally, the DOJ remains "statistics happy." The DOJ,
through the auspices of the Executive Office for United States Attorneys,
requires USAOs to submit numerous reports. It also conducts field audits. An obvious strategy for enhancing central control is to increase the
number and detail of such reports. A former AUSA with twenty years of
experience asserted that while the DOJ traditionally required "a frustratingly large number of reports," the Bush Administration "tripled those
requirements, mandating weekly, monthly, yearly, and sometimes
even
'0 3
daily reports on every conceivable category of prosecution."
Much less information about changes promoting Main Justice control of U.S. Attorneys exists from between the early 1970s and the present Bush Administration. The firings of U.S. Attorneys in the Bush
Administration, however, have provided a good deal of knowledge about
current practices. It appears that the developments described above enhancing the ability of Main Justice to reduce U.S. Attorneys' autonomy
accelerated existing trends toward centralization during the Bush
fences."

Twenty-Five FederalProsecutors to be Added to U.S./Mexico Border Districts, Alabama

Homeland
Security,
(July
31,
2006),
available
at
http://www.homelandsecurity.alabama.gov/headlines/press%20release%207-31-2006.htm.
For an excellent overview of four "mechanisms of control" over federal law enforcement discretion,
including designating the crimes additional AUSA slots must prosecute, see Daniel C. Richman,
Federal Criminal Law, CongressionalDelegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 757, 757-814 (1999).

101. The effectiveness of designating AUSA slots for specific crimes as a means of limiting
USAO discretion in the allocation of resources may be compromised by counter-measures undertaken in the field. In the Uncharted Territory Study, we interviewed a supervisor in a large office
who said:

We teach people to make sure that if they're working on a case that arguably falls into
one of these areas for which we've been given a designated slot, you book all of your
time, every single second to that program category so DOJ understands that we really
care about what they're doing [in setting priorities by designating slots].
Id.
102. Of course, as discussed above, such programs also facilitate friendships and networks of
field personnel who can then communicate with one another independent of the DOJ.
103. Elizabeth de la Vega, Editorial, The Problem with Alberto, TRUTHOUT, Apr. 22, 2007,
http://www.truthout.org/docs-2006/042207A.shtml.
The Uncharted Territory Study found confir-

mation when a supervisory AUSA asserted that the DOJ uses statistics as "a weapon" to try to assert
control.
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Administration, particularly after Alberto Gonzales replaced John
Ashcroft as Attorney General.
V. MAIN JUSTICE'S STRATEGY OF
CENTRALIZATION AND ITS EFFECTS ON USAOs
The relationship between the office of United States Attorney and
the Attorney General of the United States has, with one exception,
evolved with few defining events. The one exception came in 1870
when Congress created the DOJ. 10 4 Before, U.S. Attorneys generally
operated independently of the Attorney General, though the limited
scope of federal criminal jurisdiction meant that the potential for conflict
over criminal cases was low.'0 5 After 1870, the DOJ gradually increased
its control over USAOs to the point described in Part IV of this Article.
Sometime after 1970, the gradual movement to increased centralization
over the past century reversed. The fundamental changes described
above in the size of USAOs, the development of a corps of career
AUSAs, and the federalization of criminal justice all worked to the benefit of greater autonomy from Main Justice. Thus, a modest shift in the
balance of control toward the field characterizes the modem era. Compared to the mid-1960s and early 1970s, U.S. Attorneys today possess
more autonomy from Main Justice.
While the fundamental changes that contributed to greater U.S. Attorney autonomy unfolded gradually, most of the factors described above
that enhanced Main Justice's ability to control its field offices resulted
from quite recent decisions made in the presidency of George W. Bush,
especially under Attorney General Alberto Gonzales. The simultaneous
firings of seven U.S. Attorneys, the departure at Main Justice from the
existing consensus on U.S. Attorneys' tenure that led to the firings, and
the emphasis on selecting U.S. Attorneys with strong ties to the political
leadership at Main Justice constitute an unprecedented and extraordinary
set of developments. Indeed, a strong case can be made that Main
Justice, during the second term of George W. Bush's Administration, set
about designing and trying to implement a "Strategy of Centralization."
This Part describes the major components of this strategy. It then examines the effects of the turmoil that ensued after the firings of U.S. Attorneys on the functioning of and the morale at the DOJ. Finally, Part V
concludes by looking at the damage done to USAOs.

104. Act to Establish the Dep't of Justice, 16 Stat. 162 (1870). The Act took effect July 1,
1870.
105. For a history of the DOJ, see ALBERT LANGELUTrIG, THE DEP'T OF JUSTICE OF THE
UNITED STATES (1927) and HOMER CUMMINGS & CARL MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE (1937).
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The concerted effort to curb U.S. Attorneys autonomy constitutes
an extraordinary event in the history of DOJ and U.S. Attorney relations,
the most significant development since the establishment of the DOJ in
1870. The elements of the campaign to reduce USAO autonomy can be
derived from the description of Main Justice's departures from past practices. First, appoint "loyal Bushies" as U.S. Attorneys whenever possible, preferably by picking political officials at Main Justice. The ability
to succeed in doing this was substantially aided by the success in inserting the above-discussed new provision into the Patriot Act in 2006, giving the ability to appoint Interim U.S. Attorneys who could serve indefinitely without requiring Senate confirmation. Second, winnow out U.S.
Attorneys insufficiently responsive to Main Justice's directives and policy by encouraging some to resign and by firing others. The firings
would send a strong signal to less responsive incumbent U.S. Attorneys
to change their ways. If successful, this strategy would result in a significant centralization of decision-making in the federal criminal justice
system.
It is too soon to ascertain the reasons for Gonzalez' attempt to acquire more control over U.S. Attorneys. However, regardless of the motives, the effects of the effort to do so can be examined. Considerable
temporary and perhaps long-lasting damage has been done to the ability
of both the DOJ and its USAOs to enforce federal law, as well as to the
federal criminal justice system generally.
Although most federal executive agencies experience a loss of top
leadership in the last year of an administration, the DOJ experienced a
mass exodus in the aftermath of its firing of U.S. Attorneys and was operating without permanent officials in many of its top positions. On
August 27, 2007, the day that Attorney General Gonzales announced his
resignation, the positions of both Deputy Attorney General and Associate
Attorney General were held by "acting" appointees, and the Acting Associate Attorney General had withdrawn his nomination for the post in
June. 10 6 Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty announced in May that
10 7
he would resign; his Chief of Staff, Michael Elston, resigned in June.
The Executive Director of the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys
(EOUSA), Michael Battle, resigned in February; the Counsel to the

106. See Paul Kiel, Justice Department Resignation Roll Call, TPM MUCKRAKER, Aug. 27,
2007, http://www.tpmmuckraker.com/archives/004012.php.
107. Id.
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Director of EOUSA, Barry Scholzman, resigned in August 2007; and
10 8
Gonzales' Chief of Staff, Kyle Sampson, resigned in March.
At the same time, the heads of the Office of Legislative Affairs
(Richard A. Hertling), the Office of Legal Policy (Brett C. Gerry), and
the Environment and Natural Resources Division (Ronald J. Tenpas)
were all "acting." 10 9 Wan J. Kim, Assistant Attorney General at the Civil
Rights Division, resigned August 24, 2007, creating another vacancy.
The Solicitor General, Paul Clement, was a presidential appointee, but
was slated to become acting Attorney General when Attorney General
Gonzales left. In 2007, the DOJ exhibited the attributes of a bureaucratic
agency in disarray. In light of this turnover in its top leadership, the capacity of Main Justice to exert strong leadership of federal law enforcement must have been severely compromised. 1 0
In his farewell address to the DOJ, former Deputy Attorney General
James Comey talked about the "amazing gift" that DOJ attorneys enjoy
in the form of trust in their integrity:
That gift-the gift that makes possible so much of the good we accomplish-is a reservoir of trust and credibility, a reservoir built for
us, and filled for us by those who went before. . . . Our
obligation-as the recipients of that great gift-is to protect that
reservoir, to pass it to those that follow.' 11
The information that emerged in the aftermath of the firings suggests that
the DOJ had departed from its traditions of non-partisanship, one of the
foundations of its good reputation. The DOJ's White House Liaison,
Monica Goodling, testified to the Senate Judiciary Committee under a
grant of immunity from prosecution, stating, "I do acknowledge that I
may have gone too far in asking political questions of applicants for

108. Id. Schlozman was acting assistant attorney general for the Civil Rights Division before
replacing the fired U.S. Attorney in Kansas City, Todd Graves, and returned to Main Justice after
leaving the Kansas City post amid controversy over his performance.
109. U.S. Dep't of Justice, http://www.usdoj.gov/02organizations/02_l.html, (last visited Aug.
27, 2007).
110. See Karen Tumulty, Is the Noose Tightening on Gonzales, TIME, May 15, 2007, available
at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1621147,00.html. In that article, Tumulty quoted
one senior Justice Official as saying in May, "[t]here's a war going on between the DAG's [Deputy
Attorney General] office and the AG's [Attorney General] office. The thing that is 100% clear is
that there's really no leadership. Both the DAG and the AG are so compromised, there's no one
running the Department." Id.
I11. James Comey, Farewell Address at the Great Hall of the Dep't of Justice (Aug. 15, 2005),
available at http:www.usdoj.gov/dag/speech/2005/dagfarewell.htm.
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career positions, and I may have taken inappropriate political considera' 12
tions into account on some occasions, and I regret those mistakes."'
Goodling also testified that in her previous position in the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys she participated in the hiring of
AUSAs in offices with acting or interim U.S. Attorneys and she contin113
ued to do so when she left to work in the Attorney General's Office.
She admitted trying to stop the appointment of an AUSA in the Washington, D.C. office who she learned was a liberal Democrat. 1 4 She also acknowledged delaying other appointments on the grounds that when a
confirmed nominee was soon to replace an interim U.S. Attorney, she
was unsure of whether the new hire would be the person the new U.S.
Attorney would want to employ:
There were cases when I looked at resumes and I thought, you
know, I don't know if this is the-I don't know if this is the person
the new U.S. attorney would want to hire. Why don't we just wait
and let them take a look at the request, and if they want to hire them
when they get there then they can?" 15
Goodling also admitted to checking the political activities of candidates
for other civil service positions." 6 In his testimony, former Deputy
Attorney General Comey, referring to the possibility that the political
affiliation of applicants for career positions was being used in hiring,
stated, "[i]f that was going on, that strikes at the core of what the Department of Justice is."

May

17

Given the substance of Goodling's testimony

112. David Stout, Ex-Gonzales Aide Testifies She 'Crossed the Line', N.Y. TIMES,
23,
2007,
available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/23/washington/23cnd-

monica.html?ex=l 188705600&en=73b0d8218f2c6f06&ei=5070.
113. The approximately twenty interim U.S. Attorneys serving in the first half of 2007 did not
have as much authority to hire AUSAs as their colleagues who had been nominated by the President

and confirmed by the Senate.
114. According to one news report, a Justice Department employee claimed that Goodling told
the U.S. Attorney in the District of Columbia that the prospective AUSA "appeared, based on his
resume, to be a liberal Democrat." Eric Lipton, Colleagues Cite PartisanFocus by Justice Official,
N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2007, at Al.
115. Goodling's testimony
can
be read at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-

srv/politics/transcripts/goodling testimony_052307.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2007).
116. Testimony of Monica Goodling before the S. Judiciary Comm., May 23, 2007, available
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/transcripts/goodling-testimony_052307.html.

Representative Sherman to Goodling: "[t]here are, also, though, some particular Web sites that
just focus on people's political contributions. In looking at nonpolitical appointments, did you ever
look at FACTUM or TRE.com (ph) or any of the other sites that are pretty much focused on political

giving?" Id.Goodling replied, "Occasionally. Not terribly often. It frankly wasn't very common to
find people in the law enforcement area that were active on that site. But, yes, we did in some cases
check those records." Id.
117. That Strikes at the Core, WASH. POST, May 24, 2007, at A30.

In his farewell address, Comey suggested why he would be so concerned about allegations of
political hiring:
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and the attention it received, the erosion of trust in the integrity of the
DOJ that Comey feared may well have begun.
The controversy over the firings and their aftermath had a powerful impact on morale among career attorneys in the DOJ. At the Senate
Judiciary Committee hearings on June 24, 2007, ranking Republican
Arlen Specter in his opening statement said to Attorney General Gonzales, "[t]he issues relating to the resignations of the U.S. attorneys has
placed a very heavy cloud over the Department. There is evidence of
low morale-very low morale . . . .,
And in his closing statement,
Specter said, "[t]he consensus appears to be that the morale is at an alltime low from what has happened." 11 9 Professor Laurie Levenson of
Loyola Law School, a former AUSA who keeps in contact with federal
prosecutors nationwide, testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee
that "the perceived purging of qualified U.S. Attorneys is having a dev' 20
astating impact on the morale of Assistant United States Attorneys.'
Daniel Metcalfe, a career attorney who spent thirty-four years with the
DOJ, said in an interview that "morale among the career ranks, especially
21
the more experienced folks, is as low as you would expect it to be.'
Other former DOJ attorneys and former U.S. Attorneys were reported to
hold much the same view.1 22 Though low morale would not affect the
day-to-day handling of routine litigation, it could accelerate the departure
of experienced attorneys.
The problem with reservoirs [referring to the reservoir of trust] is that it takes tremendous time and effort to fill them, but one hole in a dam can drain them. The protection of

that reservoir requires vigilance, an unerring commitment to truth, and a recognition that
the actions of one may affect the priceless gift that benefits all.
Id.
118. Hearing on the Oversight of the Dep 't of Justice Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
110th Cong. (July 24, 2007) (testimony of U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales), available at

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/gonzalez transcript 072407.html.
119. Id.
120. Is the DOJ Politicizing the Hiring and Firing of U.S. Attorneys?: Hearing before S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (Feb. 6, 2007) (testimony of Laurie L. Levenson,
Professor
of
Law,
Loyola
Law
School),
available
at

http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=2516&wit-id=6061.
121. Tony Mauro, Justice Department's Independence "Shattered," says Former
DOJ
Attorney,
LEGAL
TIMES,
Apr.
16,
2007,
available
at
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id= 1176455062969.
122. See John S. Koppel, Bush Justice is a National Disgrace, DENVER POST, July 5, 2007,

available at http:www.truthout.org/docs_2006/070907N.shtml. In the article, Koppel, a Main Justice career attorney, wrote a stinging critique of the DOJ under Gonzales in which he said:
I can honestly say that I have never been as ashamed of the Department and government
that I serve as I am at this time .... I am confident that I am speaking on behalf of countless thousands of honorable public servants, at Justice and elsewhere, who take their responsibilities seriously and share these views.
Id. See also Liptak, supra note 26; Philip Shenon & Jim Rutenberg, Justice Department Morale at
Low Point Over Gonzales, S.F. CHRONICLE, July 28, 2007.
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The firings and the fallout from them also damaged USAOs and
affected the morale of the U.S. Attorneys who headed them.123 It was
especially likely to do so in offices where the U.S. Attorney was dismissed and an interim head appointed. As former AUSA Levenson observed, "[t]here's always some disruption. But this is greater disruption
because of what has happened .... It is nerve-wracking, and it will be

difficult. They won't be sure who to get approval from or what their priorities are., 124 If the President nominates U.S. Attorneys after the summer of 2007, by the time the Senate confirms them, they will have little
time before being replaced by the new president in 2009.
"The reality is that the new U.S. Attorneys will have virtually no
time and no likely impact on the actual cases in these offices," said
George Washington University Law School Professor Jonathan Turley.
"They will become a placeholder for the next U.S. Attorney appointed by
the next president. And so these offices
will go from an interim U.S.
125
Attorney to a lame-duck U.S. Attorney.'
One striking example of disruption in an office occurred in Minnesota, where the First Assistant U.S. Attorney and the chiefs of the civil
and criminal divisions all resigned their supervisory positions when the
nomination of the interim U.S. Attorney, Rachel Paulose, was
confirmed. 126 Paulose was a top aide to Deputy Attorney General Paul
McNulty before her appointment as interim U.S. Attorney in 2006.27 As
discussed above, it is especially difficult for interim U.S. Attorneys who
do not enjoy the prestige of Presidential nomination and Senate confirmation to exercise strong leadership; over twenty USAOs had interim
leadership in 2007.128 To the extent that the firings increased the
123. David Johnston & Neil A. Lewis, Senate Democrats Plan a Resolution on Gonzales, N.Y.

TIMES, May 18, 2007, at A16. The U.S. Attorney in New Jersey was quoted as saying, "[t]his has
been a very difficult time for all of the U.S. Attorneys. Those of us who have been around awhile
have become close. I'd say there is a palpable sense of sadness among us now." Id.
124. Amanda

Bronstad,

Who'd

Want This Job, Anyway?,

NAT'L.,

Apr.

10, 2007,

http://www.law.com/jsp/law/careercenter/lawArticleCareerCenter.jsp?id=1 176122644397&rss=new
swire (quoting former AUSA Laurie Levenson). Bronstad also quotes potential candidates to replace
fired U.S. Attorneys in several districts about the difficulties of heading at office for a short period
after the U.S. Attorney was fired. For example, someone mentioned to assume the job in New Mexico told Bronstad, "[a]ny time there's a change, there's disturbance and people jockeying for position
and not having direction. That's very difficult for government agencies." Id.
125. Id.
126. David Johnson, Deputies to a US. Attorney Step Down, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2007, at A9.
These three positions are the most important in any office, and the simultaneous resignation of all
three would create turmoil in any USAO. The article stated that "[sieveral of their associates described the action as a protest over what the three deputies regarded as Ms. Paulose's ideologically
driven and dictatorial managerial style. Id.
127. Id.
128. See Goldstein & Eggan, supra note 71. See also Carl Tobias, Stopping the Downward
Spiral at the Department of Justice, FrNDLAW, July 30, 2007, availableat
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resignation rate of experienced AUSAs, it reduced the capacity of
USAOs to take on major cases that require experienced prosecutors and
the support of a strong office head. A field office might also experience
turmoil that weakens its effectiveness when a U.S. Attorney committed
1 29
to Main Justice neglects local priorities in favor of national priorities.
It is too early to assess how lasting the damage has been to the
reputation of Main Justice and federal criminal justice in general. The
perception that the DOJ has been politicized and that the traditions of
non-partisanship and fairness in the administration of justice have been
severely compromised, even if only temporarily, is, by itself, troubling.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF U.S.
ATTORNEY AND MAIN JUSTICE RELATIONS

The degree of autonomy USAOs will be able to exercise in the future hangs in the balance. In this Part, the historical significance of the
effort to centralize control is briefly assessed before examining what the
future holds. While it is impossible to predict with any certainty how
much U.S. Attorney autonomy will be preserved in the coming years, the
factors that will determine such autonomy will be identified. The factors
include the extent to which the value of autonomy is recognized and
supported, beliefs concerning what reasons legitimately justify firing a
U.S. Attorney, the degree to which the political leadership at Main Justice in the next few years accepts or rejects field autonomy, and the role
the Senate will choose to play in the appointment and removal of U.S.
Attorneys.
The concerted effort to increase Main Justice's control over U.S.
Attorneys, which the unprecedented firings of U.S. Attorneys in 2006
laid bare, represents a signal event in the nearly 220-year history of relations between the center and the field. Only the formation of the DOJ in
1870 rivals this effort in significance, but even its establishment was
much less dramatic and its importance less obvious. The relationship
between U.S. Attorneys and Main Justice in future decades will be
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20070730_tobias.html. Tobias comes to a similar conclusion, noting that twenty-four of the ninety-three U.S. Attorneys were either acting or interim, and
that only six persons had been nominated to fill these vacancies.
129. Writing in the Daily Business Review, Julie Kay reported that the interim U.S. Attomey in
Southern Florida, Alex Acosta, told "stunned" FBI supervisors in his first meeting with them that
pornography featuring consenting adults would be a top priority of his. "His own prosecutors
have warned Acosta that prioritizing adult pom would reduce resources for prosecuting other
crimes, including porn involving children. According to high level sources who did not
want to be identified, Acosta has assigned prosecutors porn cases over their objections." US. Attorney's Porn Fight Gets Bad Reviews, DAILY BUSINESS REVIEW, Aug. 30, 2005,
availableat http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=l 125318960389.
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profoundly shaped by developments that will unfold in the next few
years. The stakes are high. Though the balance struck in the competition
between central control and field autonomy will continue to fluctuate, the
complete subordination of U.S. Attorneys by Main Justice would represent a major change in the American political system. Unless some
autonomy for U.S. Attorneys is preserved, the benefits such independence provides will disappear. Will they?
One important determinant will be the extent to which the values
embedded in U.S. Attorney autonomy are recognized and promoted.
From at least 2005 to 2007, the values associated with central control
have been ascendant, while the equally valid reasons for field autonomy
discussed in Part I of this Article have been in decline. Ironically, the
attack on the U.S. Attorney autonomy by Main Justice's assault may in
the end serve to strengthen the very values its efforts at centralization
imperiled. Thurman Arnold identified the mechanism that would lead to
this result over seventy years ago in his book The Symbols of Government.130 Citing the obvious unfairness of the Scottsboro case, he observed that:
[T]he cultural value of the ideal of a fair trial is advanced as much
by its failure as it is by its success. Any violation of the symbol of
a ceremonial trial rouses persons who would be left unmoved by an
ordinary non-ceremonial injustice. Thus, the Scottsboro Case
gained nation-wide attention. .

.

. [T]he cause of justice has been

131
dramatized in a way no one will quite forget.

The Attorney General and the President's violation of the consensus about the circumstances that warrant the firing of U.S. Attorneys attracted nationwide attention and roused those who adhered to the values
encompassed by that consensus. 32 As the extent of the effort to centralize control of U.S. Attorneys in Washington was revealed, the scope of
133
criticism broadened to include defenses of autonomy.
Whether this renewed recognition of the value of U.S. Attorney
autonomy will be sufficient to sustain such autonomy is unclear. Prior to
the Attorney General Gonzales' tenure, the tradition was that U.S. Attorneys could be fired only for personal or professional misconduct or
incompetence. They were not removed because they did not follow the
DOJ's directives on what specific cases to bring or how to handle specific cases, nor were they removed for being insufficiently responsive to
Main Justice or loyal to the President. Unless the tradition of secure
130.

THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 142 (1935).
131. Id.
132. Turrow, supra note 12.
133. Iglesias, supranote 13.
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tenure for U.S. Attorneys is restored, the prospects for their retaining
some autonomy are not good. The constant, credible fear of being fired
for not toeing the line is incompatible with the exercise of independent
judgment.
Based on many public statements about the President's authority to
fire U.S. Attorneys, this tradition of secure tenure is in trouble. President
Bush apparently recognizes no limits to his ability to fire. He made his
position clear in a briefing to the press on March 20, 2007:
As you know, I have broad discretion to replace political appointees
throughout the government, including U.S. attorneys. And in this
case, I appointed these U.S. attorneys and they served four-year
terms.... Listen, first of all, these U.S. attorneys serve at the pleasure of the President. I named them all. And the Justice Department
House accepted, that
made recommendations, which the White
34
eight of the 93 would no longer serve.'
It is not surprising that he and his political appointees would take this
position. But others who one would expect would voice limits on the
power to fire have not done so. Former Clinton Administration Department Official Rory Little told the New York Times that a U.S. Attorney
position "has always been a patronage position. Can the president fire a
U.S. attorney for any reason at all? The answer is yes. ,1 35 Even one of
the fired U.S. Attorneys, Bud Cummins, wrote, "[t]he President had an
absolute right to fire us. We served at his pleasure, and that meant we
or for no reason. And we all accepted
could be dismissed for any reason
'1 36
that fact without complaint."
The assertion that U.S. Attorneys can be fired for any reason, which
in essence transforms the clause "at the pleasure of the President" to "at
the whim of the President," is problematical on two grounds. First, some
reasons for firing a U.S. Attorney would be illegal. This would occur,
for example, if the purpose of the firing was to interfere with an ongoing
prosecution.' 37 Second, it substitutes a technical narrow legalistic view
134.

White

House

Press

Briefing

(Mar.

20,

2007),

available

at

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/03/20070320-8.html.
135. Liptak, supra note 27. Liptak also reports that Reagan Administration Solicitor General
Charles Fried said U.S. Attorneys should be disciplined and dismissed for failing to carry out the
administration's policies and priorities. Id. In practice, U.S. Attorneys traditionally were rarely if
ever fired for this reason. See discussion, supra note 30, on the existing consensus on U.S. Attorneys and the more detailed discussion of past practices in firing U.S. Attorneys in Counselfor the
United States, EISENSTEIN, supranote 2.

136. Bud Cummins, How Bush's Justice Department has "Blown It, " SALON, Mar. 31, 2007,
http://www.salon.com/opinion/feature/2007/03/3 l/cummins/.
137. See 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2006). See also Adam Cohen, Editorial Observer: It Wasn't Just a
Bad Idea. It May Have Been Against the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2007, available at
http://select.nytimes.com/search/restricted/article?res=F6071 0F93D540C7A8DDDAA0894DF40442
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of what a president could conceivably do for what presidents for decades
have in fact done. 138 Presidents hardly ever fired U.S. Attorneys and certainly not for the reasons given as justification for the 2006 firings. As
discussed above, only personal or professional misconduct resulted in
removal, and only rarely did firing for such reasons occur. Indeed, presidents permitted U.S. Attorneys whose four year terms expired to continue to serve as long as they wished. The absence of vigorous and visible rebuttals to assertions of a president's unfettered right to fire U.S.
Attorneys does not bode well for the survival of the traditional limits on
the power of removal. As a result, one of the principle foundations upon
which U.S. Attorneys' ability and willingness to make independent
judgments in carrying out their duties is being seriously eroded.
The attitudes and behavior of the political leadership at Main Justice, particularly of the next few Attorneys General and Deputy Attorneys General, will also play a major role in determining how much
autonomy U.S. Attorneys retain. To what extent will they acknowledge
the value of such autonomy and restore limits on the circumstances under
which they will seek to remove U.S. attorneys? The answer depends
both on what kind of people presidents choose to nominate to these posts
and on how extensively the Senate Judiciary Committee questions nominees for Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General about their
views of the circumstances under which U.S. Attorneys can be fired and
the answers they give. What kind of people will they recommend to the
president for appointment as U.S. Attorneys? Will they seek out people
of integrity with solid standing in and knowledge of their districts? Will
they return to the traditional level of deference to Senators in the choice
of U.S. Attorneys?
Finally, both the characteristics of U.S. Attorney nominees and the
circumstances under which successful candidates can be fired depend
upon whether United States Senators, particularly those from the
President's party, reassert their traditional prerogatives. In the past, the
DOJ often had to pay a steep price when they fired a U.S. Attorney if
(discussing this and other possible violations of law arising from the 2006 U.S. Attorney firings and
their aftermath).

138. In the operation of the American, and every democratic political system, countless actions
that are technically legal are in practice avoided. Legislators have the right to break their commitments to their colleagues at any time, but both tradition and self-interest prevent them from doing so.
Attorneys in many jurisdictions have the legal right to object to opponents requests for postponements due to vacation plans or family emergencies, but long-standing informal practice dictates the
routine granting of such requests. Indeed, it is impossible to specify in any set of written roles what
should be done in every circumstance, including when U.S. Attorneys can be fired. One of the most
ambitious efforts to control behavior by specifying a comprehensive set of rules to guide behavior,
the federal sentencing guidelines, has failed to achieve its goal of eliminating "unwarranted disparity" in federal sentences.
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their Senators strongly objected. 39 Unless the Senate reclaims its traditional role, one of the major sources of U.S. Attorneys' willingness and
ability to stand up to Main Justice, Senatorial support, will be undermined.
Could the interplay of the factors that will determine how much
autonomy U.S. Attorneys retain result in achieving the central control
sought under Attorney General Gonzales' leadership? The reaction to
his attempt to do so suggests that future efforts to continue the trend toward greater centralization will encounter resistance, and perhaps even
result in greater U.S. Attorney autonomy. If Attorney General Mukasey
and his successors recognize the value of local autonomy, revert to previous practices in deciding when to fire U.S. Attorneys, seek nominees
with integrity and ties to their districts, and defer more to the Senate in
selecting U.S. Attorneys, the balance between central control and field
autonomy will return to what existed prior to 2001. But, regardless of
whether U.S. autonomy is restored, expanded, or abolished, the way the
federal criminal justice system operates will be profoundly affected.

139. A former Attorney General, when asked if he had fired any U.S. Attorneys, replied that he
had removed several, but continued, "[wle kept some we wouldn't have kept just because we
couldn't take the pressure from the senator. Nine times out of ten the U.S. attorney gets backing
from the senators. It's a costly move to fire them." EISENSTEIN, supra note 2, at 98.

